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Abstract
Incompleteness or inconsistency? Kurt Go¨del shocked the
mathematical community in 1931 when he proved any effectively
generated, sufficiently complex, and sound axiomatic system could
not be both consistent and complete. This thesis will explore two
formal languages of logic and their associated mechanically recur-
sive proof methods with the goal of proving Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorems. This, in combination with an assignment of a natural
number to every string of an axiomatic system, will be used to
show a consistent system contains a true statement of the form
“This sentence is unprovable,” and a complete system contains a
proof of its own consistency only if it is inconsistent.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Prove that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent. David Hilbert posed
this question in 1900 when he released his collection of 23 problems he hoped
mathematicians would solve in the 20th century. Thirty years later, a young
Kurt Go¨del answered this query when he proved the axioms of arithmetic
could not be both consistent and complete, that is, the axioms could either
both prove and disprove a statement or there was a statement which was true,
but unprovable.
“One can (assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) even
give examples of propositions which are reallly contextually true
but unprovable in the formal system of classical mathematics.” [7,
pp. 155-156]
This is Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem, a single sentence innocu-
ously and informally announced October 7th, 1930 during a general discussion
on the third and final day of a conference in Ko¨nisberg (the capital of East
Prussia). At the time, Go¨del was 24, a relatively unknown graduate student
who gave a twenty minute lecture on the completeness of first order logic the
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day before. He stated his famous theorem in such a matter-of-fact way that
almost everyone in attendance, with the exception of John von Neumann,
underestimated its significance. The discussion itself, into which Go¨del had
interjected his claim, continued on as if the statement had never been made.
Although most mathematicians at the Ko¨nisberg conference reacted
with incomprehension to Go¨del’s statement, its ramifications were eventually
realized. Peano Arithmetic, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, group theory; al-
most every non-trivial axiomatic system is hampered by either inconsistency
or incompleteness. By itself, Go¨del’s proof was remarkable. It used natural
numbers to describe metamathematics (logic) and show the sentence “This
very statement is not provable within the system,” was true, but unprovable,
all the while avoiding a paradox.
This thesis will use logic to prove Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems.
The first chapter is devoted to sentential logic, a formal language consisting
of true and false statements which can be combined using connectives. First
order logic is an extension of sentential logic, obtained by the addition of vari-
ables, parameters, predicates and quantifiers. Models will be used to illustrate
these concepts in various axiomatic systems. Semantic tableaus will prove
that certain statements in logic or an axiomatic system are true. Semantic
Tableaus will then be used to show both sentential and first order logic are
sound and complete, that is, a statement of logic is true if and only if there
exists a proof for it. In the sixth chapter, first order logic will be used to
prove every axiomatic system which contains basic arithmetic also contains a
sentence which is true, but unprovable, proving Go¨del’s First Incompleteness
Theorem. His Second Incompleteness Theorem, which states the lack of a
proof for consistency in such an axiomatic system, will follow from the first.
2
Chapter 2
Sentential Logic
This chapter is about sentential logic, a simple language whose main
building block is the proposition. It is a two-valued logic, which, unlike its
multi-valued counterparts, limits the truth values of its propositions to the
set {T,F}. Various propositions with different truth values can be combined
via the sentential connectives to give a combined proposition with a single
truth value. When they are combined according to the syntax of sentential
logic, these propositions are referred to as well-formed formula (or wffs). The
Unique Readability Theorem of this chapter will be show that each of these
wffs has a unique truth value. Truth tables will also be used to show some wffs
are always true, regardless of the individual truth values of their component
propositions. Such wffs are known as tautologies.
2.1 An Introduction to Sentential Logic
Sentential Logic, also known as propositional logic, is a system of
meaningful symbols which can be specifically arranged and combined with
other elements of the sentential logic syllabary to create meaningful state-
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ments. This chapter will explore and explain the three groups of symbols
which comprise sential logic, the first of which is the proposition.
Definition 2.1 A proposition p is a statement which is either true or false,
but not both.
These values, true (T) and false (F), are referred to as truth values.
Propositions are found in many languages, from English and Chinese to arith-
metic and set theory. The symbols p, q, r, p1, q1, r1, etc, are used in sentential
logic to represent propositions and their associated meanings.
Example 2.2 Which of the following sentences are propositions?
p: The capitol of Montana is Helena.
q: 7÷ 14 = 3
r: Take out the garbage.
s: x is an even number.
t: This sentence is false
The first sentence p is true and the second, q, is false, so p and q are
both propositions. The third statement r is a command and cannot claim
to be either true or false while the fourth, s, includes a variable x which is
unknown. Thus r and s have no truth value and therefore are not propositions.
However, note that if x were assigned a value, s becomes a proposition.
The truth value of the last sentence t is tricky to ascertain. ‘This
sentence is false,” is known as the liar’s paradox. If t is true, then so is the
statment “This sentence is false,” implying the sentence t is actually false.
But if t is false, then the statement “This sentence is false” is untrue and t
must be true. Thus t could be considered both, or neither, true and false.
Regardless, it has no single truth value and thus is not a proposition. This
discrepancy of truth values is indicative of a paradox.
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Definition 2.3 A paradox is a statement, or group of statments, which lead
to a contradiction.
Paradoxes are both a vexation and a delight for mathematicians. They
can illustrate a concept, indicate a flawed mathematical system, or even lead
to new branches of mathematics.
Example 2.4 Let a = b be a true proposition of algrebra. Multiply both
sides by a to get a2 = ab. Subtract b2 from both sides for a2 − b2 = ab − b2.
Factoring then gives (a − b)(a + b) = (a − b)b. Divide by (a − b) for the
expression to have the form a+ b = b. Now a = b, so the expression becomes
(b) + b = b or 2b = b. Divide by b and it is evident 2 = 1!
Reviewing the derivation, it is evident an illegal algebraic action oc-
curred. a = b implies a − b = 0, thus dividing by (a − b) causes ‘math
destruction.’ The paradox that arises from division by zero helps illustrate
why this act is prohibited.
Example 2.5 In 1901, British mathematician Bertrand Russell discovered a
paradox in naive set theory [14]. Russell constructed a set S that is the set of
all sets that are not members of themselves (in set theory notation this reads
as S = {s : s 6∈ s}). He then posed the question, is S a member of itself? If S
is a member of itself (S ∈ S) it contradicts its’ own definition, and if it is not
a member of itself (S 6∈ S), then it should be a member of itself by the same
definition. This became known as Russel’s Paradox, and the effort to avoid it
led to the creation of Russell’s type theory and Zermelo-Fraenkel set thoery.
Example 2.6 Russell illustrated his paradox using the Barber puzzle [1] which
states there is a town with only one (male) barber and every man is kept shaven
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by either shaving himself or by going to the barber, exclusively. Equivalently,
this can be stated as “the barber shaves only those men in town who do not
shave themselves”. So, who shaves the barber?
If he shaves himself, then the barber doesn’t shave him. If he does not
shave himself then the barber does shave him. Either way, he is still the barber
and he ends up both sh aving and not shaving himself, an apparant contra-
diction. Note that the barber shaving himself is a self-referential statement,
it is equivalent to stating that the barber shaves the barber. This notion of
self-reference will arise again in the proof of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems.
Although there are many, many more paradoxes that could be exam-
ined, consider instead the statement “p: p is not provable.” If “not provable”
were replaced with “false,” p would be t of example 2.2. However, while a
statement which attests its’ own falsity leads to a paradox, one which pro-
claims its’ own unprovability does not. This is the essence of Kurt Go¨del’s
first incompleteness theorem, which he introduced in 1930 at the Ko¨nigsberg
conference. However, before this theorem can be addressed, it is necessary
to establish a firmer grounding in logic. To this end, let us turn our atten-
tion towards the second set of symbols from the sentential logic syllabary: the
sentential connectives.
Definition 2.7 Given propositions p and q, the following are sentential con-
nectives, or propositional connectives, with their associated truth values:
The negation of p is the propostion “not p”. Denoted (¬p), it is true
only when p is false.
6
The conjunction of p and q is the proposition “p and q”. Denoted
(p ∧ q), it is true only when both p and q are true.
The disjunction of p and q is the proposition “p or q”. Denoted (p∨ q),
it is true if either p is true or q is true, or both. Here, ∨ is considered an
“inclusive or.” An “exclusive or” requires p or q be true, but not both.
In example 2.6, the ‘or’ used was exclusive rather than inclusive. In this
paper, ∨ will always refer to the “inclusive or.”
The implication p implies q is the proposition “If p, then q.” Denoted
(p ⇒ q), it is false only if p is true and q is false simultaneously (Thus,
if p is false or q is true individually, the implication is true).
The equivalence of p and q is the proposition ”p if and only if q”.
Denoted (p ⇔ q) and often abbreviated to ”p iff q”, it is true only if
both p and q have the same truth values.
Definition 2.8 A compound proposition is a proposition formed using
sentential connectives while a simple proposition is one without sentential
connectives.
The propositions of example 2.2 are all simple propositions, while exam-
ples 2.9 through 2.13 show how sentential connectives combine simple propo-
sitions in various ways to create compound propositions. The truth values
of these propositions rely on certain unspoken assumptions, primary among
them, the frame of reference in which the proposition is being interpreted. For
example, if p is the propositon “6 < 7,” there is an implicit understanding
that 6 and 7 are numerical quantities and < is the inequality symbol indicat-
ing the first is ‘less than’ the second. Similarly, the proposition The capital of
7
Montana is Helena is true because there is an implication the proposition is
interpreted at the current date, rather than, for example, the year 1860 (before
Helena was founded). Thus, for examples 2.9 through 2.13, truth values are
evaluated based on the “obvious” assumptions of the propositions, i.e., if the
snow is green, it not because green dye was spilled on it.
Example 2.9 Negation: Consider the following propositions and their nega-
tions.
p: (1 + 1 = 3) (¬p): (1 + 1 6= 3)
q: (1 + 1 = 2) (¬q): (1 + 1 6= 2)
r: (1 + 1 6= 3) (¬r): (1 + 1 = 3)
(¬p) is true as p is false while (¬q) and (¬r) are false as q and r are true.
Note that (¬p) = r and (¬r) = p so (¬(¬p)) = (¬r) = p. This illustraties
that the double negation of a proposition is the proposition itself.
Example 2.10 Conjunction: Consider the following propositions and their
conjunctions.
p1: Water contains hydrogen.
q1: Africa is a continent.
r1: Stop signs are triangular.
s1: The Earth has three moons.
p2: Water contains oxygen.
q2: Snow is green.
r2: Stop signs are red.
s2: Paris is the capital of France.
p = (p1 ∧ p2) : Water contains hydrogen and oxygen.
q = (q1 ∧ q2) : Africa is a continent and snow is green.
r = (r1 ∧ r2) : Stop signs are triangular and red.
s = (s1 ∧ s2) : The Earth is square and Paris is the capital of France.
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Here only the first compound proposition p is true, while in the last
three, q, r, and s, at least one of the simple propositions used with the con-
juction is false.
Example 2.11 Disjunction: Consider the following propositions and their
disjunctions.
p1: 3 is odd.
q1:
√
9 = 3
r1: 5 is even.
s1: i is real
p2: 7 is odd.
q2: 2
2 = 5
r2: 6 is even.
s2: i
2 is positive.
p = (p1 ∨ p2) : 3 or 7 is odd.
q = (q1 ∨ q2) :
√
9 = 3 or 22 = 5
r = (r1 ∨ r2) : 5 or 6 is even.
s = (s1 ∨ s2) : i is real or i2 is positive
Here at least one simple propostion used in the first three compound
propositions p, q, and r is true so all three are true. In the last, s, both simple
propositions s1 and s2 are false and thus the entire compound proposition is
false.
When an implication (p ⇒ q) occurs between two propositions p and
q, p is called the antecedent while q is known as the consequent. When a
person uses an implication in everyday conversation, the truth value often relies
on the relationship between the antecedent and the consequent. For example,
the statement “If I don’t work, then I don’t have any money,” is true based
on the consequent being tacitly understood as an effect of the antecedent, not
on the individual truth values of the two. In sentential logic, the statment is
only true if “If I don’t work,” is false or if “I don’t have any money,” is true.
Similarly, the statement “If I don’t work, then I am a millionaire,” is true
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only if “If I don’t work,” is false or if “I am a millionaire,” is true. Thus the
truth value of a compound proposition does not rely on the consequent being
a consequence of the antecedent.
Example 2.12 Implication: Consider the following propositions and the
implication between them.
p1: (
√
5 = 3)
q1: 6 is a prime number.
r1: April has 30 days
s1: Deciduous trees lose leaves
p2: (6 < 7)
q2: 12 is a prime number.
r2: May has 31 days.
s2: Pine trees lose needles.
p = (p1 ⇒ p2) : ((
√
5 = 3)⇒ (6 < 7))
q = (q1 ⇒ q2) : If 6 is a prime number then 12 is as well.
r = (r1 ⇒ r2) : If April has 30 days then May has 31.
s = (s1 ⇒ s2) : If deciduous trees lose their leaves then pine trees lose
their needles.
The first two compound propositions p and q are true as p1 and q1 are
false (the truth value of p2 and q2 are irrelevant when the antecedents are
false). In proposition r, both r1 and r2 are true so r is as well. In the last
compound proposition s, the antecedent s1 true but the consequent s2 is not,
so the proposition is false.
Example 2.13 Equivalence: Consider the following propositions and the
equivalence between them. Note that the phrase “if and only if” is abbreviated
to “iff.”
p = (p2 ⇔ p2) : The dodo bird is extinct iff the manatee is endangered.
q = (q1 ⇔ q2) : Earth is larger than the sun iff bananas are pink.
r = (r1 ⇔ r2) : (4 + 2 = 6)⇔ (4− 2 = 6)
s = (s1 ⇔ s2) : The U.S.’s flag is green iff Japan’s flag is red and white.
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p1: The dodo bird is extinct.
q1: Earth is larger than the sun.
r1: (4 + 2 = 6)
s1: The U.S.A.’s flag is green.
p1: The manatee is endangered.
q2: Bananas are pink.
r2: (4− 2 = 6)
s2: Japan’s flag is red and white.
In the compound propositions p and q the simple propositions which
comprise them have identical truth values. In the last two compound propo-
sitions r and s the simple propositions have contradicting truth values. Thus
the first two compound propositions are true and the last two are false.
The third and final set of symbols from the sential logic syllabary are
the left and right parenthses ( ). These allow compound propositions to contain
more than two simple propositions, indicating which propositions are associ-
ated with which connectives and the order in which their truth values should
be ascertained. To find the truth value of such compound propositions, simply
note that applying definition 2.7 causes two propositions and a connective to
combine into a single proposition.
Example 2.14 For p, q, and r true and s false propositions, find the truth
values of the following compound propositions.
1: ((p ∨ q) ∧ r)
2: (¬(p⇔ q))
3: ((p ∨ q)⇒ (r ∧ s))
The parenthesis in 1 indicate the truth value of (p∨ q) should be found
first and then used to evaluate the remainder of the proposition. As (p∨ q) is
true, so is ((p∨q)∧r). In 2, the parenthesis indicate the truth value of (p⇔ q)
(true), should be negated and thus (¬(p⇔ q)) is false. The parenthesis of the
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last expression indicate (p∨q) is a true antecedent and (r∧s) a false consequent,
thus the implication ((p ∨ q)⇒ (r ∧ s)) is false.
Thus propositions, the propositional connectives, and the left and right
parentheses form the syllabary of sentential logic. However, the truth values of
simple and compound propositions remains highly subjective, so it is necessary
to find more precise definitions which avoid this ambiguity.
2.2 Sentential Logic as a Mapping
The definitions to this point have been described using the English
language which can be vague and misinterpreted. For example, consider the
sentence “Alaska is a cool place for a vacation.” Is this saying Alaska has a
low temperature or is it indicating Alaska is a trendy location to relax? Even
if the meaning is clear, the truth value of the sentence is conditional on who
interprets it.
In example 2.9, we saw the double negation of a proposition is the
proposition. However, in some dialects of English, this is not the case. The
true propositional sentence “Earth got a moon.” has two negations: “Earth got
no moon,” and “Earth ain’t got a moon,” . The negation of these negations is
then “Earth ain’t got no moon,”. But while the original proposition was true,
the double negation is false in the dialect.
Implication and bijection also fall prey to misunderstandings. The sen-
tences “If the Earth’s surface is 70.8% water then it is 29.2% land,” and “If the
Earth’s surface is 90% water then it is 29.2% land,” are both true compound
propositions, but the second sentence is false when considered as a simple
proposition where the truth value depends on whether “The Earth’s surface
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is 29.2% land,” is a valid consequence of “The Earth’s surface is 90% land.”
The English language wants to create a dependence between the antecedent
and the consequent that does not exist in sentential logic.
Thus it is necessary to refine the previous definitions, avoiding the
ambiguity of the English language by focusing on the mapping that exists
between propositions, their connectives, and the set of truth values {T, F}. A
mapping, or a function, is an association between two sets where every element
in the first set is paired with exactly one element of the second. In sentential
logic, the only mapping considered is called the truth assignment, a function
which sends propositions to their truth values, i.e. the map,
{p, q, r, p1, q1, r1, ...} → {T,F}
The truth value of a proposition p given by a truth assignment M will be
denoted pM .
Definition 2.15 A proposition is a symbol p and a truth assignment which
yields pM .
Thus the notion of ‘understanding’ whether p is true or false is cir-
cumvented; the mapping explicitely gives p a truth value pM (although note
there are multiple possible truth assignments). Propositional connectives act
as operators, producing a new truth value from the truth values of one or more
propositions.
Definition 2.16 A sentential connective is an operation which sends the
truth values, given by an assignment M , of one or two propositions p and q to
a single truth value as follows:
(¬p) : {T, F} → {F, T}
If pM = T then (¬p)M = F.
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If pM = F then (¬p)M = T.
(p ∧ q): {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
If pM = T and qM = T then (p ∧ q)M = T.
Otherwise, (p ∧ q)M = F.
(p ∨ q): {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
If pM = F and qM = F then (p ∨ q)M = F.
Otherwise, (p ∨ q)M = T.
(p⇒ q): {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
If pM = T and qM = F then (p⇒ q)M = F.
Otherwise, (p⇒ q)M = T.
(p⇔ q): {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
If pM = qM then (p⇔ q)M = T.
If pM 6= qM then (p⇔ q)M = F.
The first connective ¬ is called an unary operation as it works only on
a single proposition. The other connectives are called binary operations as
they apply to two propositions.
Definition 2.17 A compound proposition is a proposition with at least
one sentential connective operation while a simple proposition is a propo-
sition with no sentential connective operation.
If α is a compound proposition containing simple propositions {p1, p2, · · · , pk}
then a truth assignment is a function Mα: {T, F}k → {T, F}, where
{T, F}k = {T, F}x{T, F}x...x{T, F} (the cross product of k sets of {T, F}).
Example 2.18 For p, q, and r propositions, the following are truth assign-
ments for the associated compound proposition.
(¬p): {T, F} → {F, T}
(p ∨ q): {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
((p ∨ q)⇒ r): {T, F} x {T, F} x {T, F} → {T, F}
(p ∨ p ∨ · · · ∨ p): {T, F} x {T, F} x · · · x {T, F} → {T, F}
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Although the ambiguity surrounding sentential logic has begun to dissi-
pate with these definitions, there is still an elephant in the room. As sentential
logic is merely a collection of symbols, why do these propositions have mean-
ing? In what order can the symbols of sential logic be arranged and still have
a truth assignment? To answer these questions it is necessary to explore the
syntax of sentential logic.
2.3 Syntax
With an infinite number of disctinct symbols available in sentential
logic, it is necessary to develop a formal grammar, or syntax, which allows a
mathematician to distinguish valid propositions from gibberish. Just as ”red
roses are violets blue and” is incomprehensible in English, p)(q∨ is nonsensical
in sentential logic. Syntax specifies the order in which various symbols can
be arranged and allows the meaning of various phrases and expressions to be
consistently interpreted. Such arrangements of symbols, whether adhering to
syntax or not, are called strings.
Definition 2.19 A string is a finite sequence of symbols taken from a specific
set of symbols (a syllabary).
Example 2.20 The following are strings in their associated alphabets.
elephant, abc, and brugtsx in the English alphabet.
1+3=4, 6-2=100, and = 896− in arithmetic.
α ∈ Γ, ∅, and A ∩B ⊃ in set theory.
p)(q∨, (p ∨ q), and p ∨ q in sentential logic.
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Definition 2.21 The length of a string S=s1s2...sn (where si is a symbol or
letter) is the number n. Note that a length of 0 represents the empty string.
The length of strings may seem inconsequential, but is vital in many
proofs of this thesis that use induction.
Example 2.22 Find the lengths (L) of the strings in example 2.20.
Alphabet String L String L String L
English elephant 8 abc 3 brugtsx 7
Arithmetic 1 + 3 = 4 5 6− 2 = 100 5 = 896− 6
Set Theory α ∈ Γ 3 ∅ 1 A ∩B ⊃ 4
Sentential Logic p)(q∨ 5 (p ∨ q) 5 p ∨ q 3
Definition 2.23 A formal language is a set of finite strings defined using
rules of formation (also called the formal grammer or syntax of the language).
Languages such as English or French have no set rules of formation
and thus are not formal languages. Naive set theory, or Cantor’s set thoery,
as it relies on natural language to describe sets, is also not a formal language.
Formal languages do not have to be deeply developed and may contain only a
finite number of strings.
Example 2.24 Consider the following constructed formal language with the
alphabet { c, s, r, m, is, on, ad, at, -} and formal grammer:
1: A string must have a length of seven.
2: The third and fifth symbol must be ” -”.
3: A symbol from the set {ad, at} must be directly preceded by a
symbol from the set {c, s, r, m}
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Condsider the following strings:
◦ c a t - i s - s a d
◦ s a t - o n - r a t
◦ r a t - i s - f l a t
◦ m a d - a t - c a t
◦ c - - - - - - -m
The first two strings follow the rules of formation in this language. The
third has a symbol not in the alphabet, ”fl”. The fourth violates rule 3 as ”at”
is preceded by ”-”. The last follows the rules of formation. Note that there is
no inherent meaning to any of the strings until it is assigned by the user, i.e.
”c a t - i s - s a d” and ”c - - - - - m” are ‘equally’ significant.
Sentential logic can now be defined as a formal language with an infinite
number of distinct symbols, including propositions, propositional connectives,
and the left and right parenthesis from which, following the rules of formation,
strings called well-formed formula can be constructed .
Definition 2.25 A well-formed formula, or wff, is a string which follows
the syntax of sentential logic, i.e. can be obtained by applying a finite number
of times the following rules of formation:
p: If p is a proposition, then p is a wff.
¬: If α is a wff, then (¬α) is a wff.
∧: If α and β are wffs, then (α ∧ β) is a wff.
∨: If α and β are wffs, then (α ∨ β) is a wff.
⇒: If α and β are wffs, then (α⇒ β) is a wff.
⇔: If α and β are wffs, then (α⇔ β) is a wff.
(Note that this is a recursive definition so additional wffs can be constructed
from the newly formed ones above.)
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Definition 2.26 A simple wff is a proposition while a compound wff is a
wff formed by applying the rules of formation to at least one other wff
Example 2.27 For α and β wffs, the following are compound wffs.
• (¬α), (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β), (α⇒ β), and (α⇔ β).
• ((¬α)⇒ β)
• ((α ∨ β)⇔ (β ⇒ α))
Definition 2.28 A parsing sequence of a wff α is a series of strings created
by repeatedly applying the rules of formation in a recursive manner. A string
which is not a wff does not have a parsing sequence.
Example 2.29 Consider the last line of strings from example 2.20 with p and
q propositions. It is evident that p)(q∨ cannot be created using the rules of
formation while (p ∨ q) can and has the parsing sequence
1: p and q are wffs by the first rule of formation.
2: (p ∨ q) is a wff by ∨ and 1.
However p∨q, although very similar to (p∨q), does not have a parsing sequence
and is therefore not a wff.
These missing parenthesis may seem inconsequential (after all, it is
easily understood p ∨ q is equivalent to (p ∨ q)), but their location can vastly
change the meaning of a sentence. For example ((p ∨ q) ∧ r)⇒ s ∨ t could be
either ((p∨ q)∧ r)⇒ (s∨ t) or (((p∨ q)∧ r)⇒ s)∨ t. For this reason there is
an understood ”order of operations” that indicates which wffs should be given
precedence and allows the dropping of excessive parenthesis.
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Definition 2.30 The order of operations for a wff is listed (in descending
importance) below:
(, ): Strings inside parenthesis
¬: Negation
∨,∧: Disjunction and Conjunction
⇒,⇔: Implication and Equivalence
Thus it is evident ((p∨q)∧r)⇒ s∨t is equivalent to ((p∨q)∧r)⇒ (s∨t)
rather than (((p ∨ q) ∧ r)⇒ s) ∨ t. Wffs which are simplified using the order
of operations are often called abbreviated wffs.
Example 2.31 Consider the abbreviated wff ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∧ (s ∨ t). Using the
order of operations, work backwards to find its original form
Parenthesis: ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∧ (s ∨ t)
Negations: (¬p) ∧ q ⇔ r ∧ (s ∨ t)
Disjunction and Conjunction: ((¬p) ∧ q)⇔ (r ∧ (s ∨ t))
Implication: (((¬p) ∧ q)⇔ (r ∧ (s ∨ t)))
However, it is interesting to note if the string had been ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∧ s ∨ t
it would have been impossible to recapture the original form as it is unclear
whether r ∧ s ∨ t is (r ∧ s) ∨ t or r ∧ (s ∨ t). Thus it is important to use
parenthesis to avoid confusion when two connectives are on the same “level”
of order of operations and can potentially apply to the same wffs.
Example 2.32 Find the parsing sequence for the abbreviated wff ¬p ∧ q ⇔
r ∨ (s ∨ t)
1: p, q, r, s, and t are wffs by the first rule of formation.
2: (s ∨ t) is a wff by ∨ and 1.
3:(¬p), and thus ¬p, is a wff by ¬ and 1.
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4: ((¬p) ∧ q), and thus¬p ∧ q is a wff by ∧, 1, and 3.
5: (r ∨ (s ∨ t)), and thus r ∧ (s ∨ t) is a wff by ∨, 1, and 2.
6: (((¬p) ∧ q)⇔ (r ∨ (s ∨ t))), and thus ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t) is a wff by
⇔, 4, and 5.
However, this is not the only parsing sequence for this wff; the following
sequence is equally valid
1: p, q, r, s, and t are wffs by the first rule of formation.
2: (¬p), and thus ¬p, is a wff by ¬ and 1.
3:(s ∨ t) is a wff by ∨ and 1.
4: (r ∨ (s ∨ t)), and thus r ∨ (s ∨ t) is a wff by ∨, 1, and 3.
5: ((¬p) ∧ q), and thus¬p ∧ q is a wff by ∧, 1, and 2.
6: (((¬p) ∧ q)⇔ (r ∨ (s ∨ t))), and thus ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t) is a wff by
⇔, 4, and 5.
Differences in parsing sequences arise from the order in which we eval-
uate component wffs. For example, given a string (α1 ∗αα2)∗ (β1 ∗β β2), where
α1, α2, β1, and β2 are wffs and ∗α, ∗β, and ∗ are binary connectives, there are
two possible parsing sequences:
1: α1, α2, β1, and β2 are wffs by hypothesis.
2: (α1 ∗α α2) is a wff by 1 and ∗α
3: (β1 ∗β β2) is a wff by 1 and ∗β
4: (α1 ∗α α2) ∗ (β1 ∗β β2) is a wff by 3, 4, and ∗.
and
1: α1, α2, β1, and β2 are wffs by hypothesis.
3: (β1 ∗β β2) is a wff by 1 and ∗β
2: (α1 ∗α α2) is a wff by 1 and ∗α
4: (α1 ∗α α2) ∗ (β1 ∗β β2) is a wff by 3, 4, and ∗.
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Each parsing sequence originated from a different order in which the
wffs joined by a binary connective were evaluated. Thus many different parsing
sequences often exist for the same wff. This raises the worry that there may be
numerous interpretations of a single wff as well. Now that parsing sequences
gives us a step by step look at a wff, it is tempting to jump right in and assign
truth value. However, it is evident different parsing sequences exist for the
same wff. Thus it must first be proven that every wff of sentential logic can
only be interpreted in one way; that it is not possible to get two different truth
values for a wff from a single truth assignment.
2.4 Uniqueness of Truth Values
Many of the proofs in this section rely heavily on induction of the length
of wffs, including the Unique Readability Theorem, which proves the unique-
ness of a wff’s truth value. Once such uniqueness has been proven, truth values
can be assigned to a wff based on the truth values of its individual components.
Definition 2.33 A wff is balanced if it has the same number of left brackets
as right brackets.
Theorem 2.34 Every wff is balanced.
Proof: If a wff has length 0 it is the empty string and thus (trivially)
the wff is balanced. If a wff has lenth 1, then it must be a proposition and has
no brackets so is balanced. Assume every wff of length n or less is balanced
and suppose α is a wff of lenth n + 1. Then α is in one of two forms: If
α = (¬β) then β has a length of at most n and is balanced by assumption.
α then has one more of each bracket than β and hence is also balanced. If
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α = (β1 ∗ β2) where ∗ is binary connective then β1 and β2 are wffs of length n
or less and balanced. Then the number of left brackets in β1 and β2 plus 1 is
equal to the number of total left brackets in α. The number of right brackets
is the same, so α is balanced. Thus, by induction, all wffs are balanced.
Definition 2.35 A string s is an initial part of another string p if s is formed
by removing one or more symbols at the end of p.
Example 2.36 Consider the wff ((p ∨ q) ∧ r). The initial parts of α are the
empty string and the strings
(, ((, ((p, ((p∨, ((p ∨ q, ((p ∨ q), ((p ∨ q)∧, ((p ∨ q) ∧ r
However, note that none of the above strings are wffs, which leads to
theorem 2.37.
Theorem 2.37 Any string which is an initial part of a wff is not a wff.
Proof: Consider a wff α of length n. If n = 0 then α is the empty
string and not a wff. If n = 1 the initial part of α must be the empty string
and thus is not a wff. Assume that any initial part of a wff with length at
most n is not a wff. Let α be a wff of length n + 1. Then α is either (¬β) or
(β1 ∗ β2) where ∗ is a binary connective.
Case 1: α is (¬β). Let it be assumed an initial part s of α is a wff,
and attempt to find a contradiction. If s is a wff then α is s followed by
some non-empty string t (written α = st for convenience). Now s is either
the single left parenthesis (and thus not a wff and thus a contradiction) or
begins with (¬ . So s = (¬u) where u is a wff. So (¬β) = α = st = (¬u)t
becomes, by removing the initial ¬ and parenthesis, β = ut. But then β is a
wff with length at most n and has the wff u as an initial part, contradicting
22
the induction hypothesis that any initial part of a wff with length at most n
is not a wff. Thus s cannot be a wff.
Case 2: α is (β1 ∗ β2). Assume an initial part s of α is a wff (again
looking for contradiction). Then α = st where t is not the empty string. Now
s begins with “(”, so either s = (¬s1) or s = (s1 ◦s2) for ◦ a binary connective,
and wffs s1 and s2.
Subcase 2.1: s is (¬s1). Then (β1 ∗β2) = (¬s1)t, and by removal
of the first parenthesis, β1 ∗ β2) = ¬s1)t. But then β1 begins with a ¬ and
can’t be a wff (the rules of formation don’t allow it). Thus s cannot be a wff.
Subcase 2.2: s is (s1 ◦ s2). Then (β1 ∗ β2) is (s1 ◦ s2)t and by
removing the initial “(”, this becomes β1 ∗ β2) = s1 ◦ s2)t. Both β1 and s1 are
wffs with length at most n, so by the induction hypothesis, neither can be an
initial part of the other. However, they begin at the same place within α, so
they can only be the same. Thus β1 ∗ β2) = β1 ◦ s2)t which implies ∗ = ◦ and
β2) = s2)t. But then the wff s2 is an initial part of the wff β2 of length at most
n, giving a contradition to the induction hypothesis. Hence s is not a wff.
Thus, by induction, any string which is an inital part of a wff is not a
wff.
Definition 2.38 The main connective of a wff α is the connective used in
the last step of its parsing sequence.
If α, β1 and β2 are wffs and ∗ is a binary connective, then if α = (β1∗β2),
∗ is the main connective.
Example 2.39 The main connective for the wff ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t) is ⇔ as
by example 2.32, it is the last connective used in step 6 of its parsing sequence.
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If α is a simple wff then it does not have a sentential connective and
thus does not have a main connective either. Note that a simple wff is a simple
proposition, and does not start with a left parenthesis.
Theorem 2.40 The Unique Readability Theorem: Every wff α which
starts with a left parenthesis has exactly one main connective.
Proof: Then α is of the form (¬β) or (β1 ∗ β2) where ∗ is a binary
connective and β, β1, and β2 are wffs.
Case 1: α = (¬β). Then its parsing sequence has only two steps; 1: β
is a wff by hypothesis and 2: (¬β) is a wff by ¬. Thus ¬ must be the main
connective.
Case 2: α = (β1 ∗ β2). Suppose also that α = (δ1 ◦ δ2) where δ1 and
δ2 are wffs and ◦ is a binary connective. The goal is to suppose there are two
main connectives ∗ and ◦ and show they are the same. Then β1 and δ1 must
start at the same place (after the first left bracket). But by theorem 2.37,
neither β1 or δ1 can be an intial part of the other or they wouldn’t be wffs.
Thus β1 = δ1, ∗ = ◦, and β2 = δ2.
This theorem implies every wff is uniquely interpreted, as every wff
which is not a simple proposition can be broken down into shorter wffs in only
one way. For example, consider a wff α which begins with a left parenthesis
(i.e., is not a simple proposition). The Unique Readability Theorem says there
is exactly one main connective, so α = (α1 ∗ α2) or α = (¬β). Either way,
every new wff which is not a simple proposition breaks down into smaller wffs
combined via a main connective. There is no other options to break down
the wffs, so α can only be read in one way. Thus for every model, or truth
assignment, there is only one truth value per wff.
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Definition 2.41 A model M is a function which assigns every proposition p
a truth value pM , i.e. a mapping M : {p1, p2, ...} → {T,F}.
In other words, the truth values of propositions depend on the model
in which they exist. In an alternative dimension M , where swine have wings,
the proposition p: pigs fly takes a different truth value. Often this is denoted
pM = T to indicate a certain proposition is true in a given model, or untrue
in a model by pM 6= T or pM = F .
Example 2.42 Consider the commutative property a∗b = b∗a. While always
true in certain models such as :
∗: Addition of real numbers: x+ y = y + x
∗: Multiplication of complex numbers: (a+bi) ·(c+di) = (c+di) ·(a+bi)
∗: Dot product of vectors: ~a ·~b = ~b · ~a
∗: Z6 the integers mod 6
It can be false in other models:
∗: Subtraction of real numbers: x− y 6= y − x
∗: Division of complex numbers: (a+ bi)÷ (c+ di) 6= (c+ di)÷ (a+ bi)
∗: Cross product of vectors: ~a×~b 6= ~b× ~a
∗: S3 the symmetric group of order 3
Definition 2.43 To find the truth value αM of a wff α in a model M , simply
use the following rules:
p: If α is a proposition p, then αM = pM .
¬: If αM = T then (¬α)M = F.
If αM = F then (¬α)M = T.
∧: If αM = T and βM = T then (α ∧ β)M = T.
Otherwise, (α ∧ β)M = F.
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∨: If αM = F and βM = F then (α ∨ β)M = F.
Otherwise, (α ∨ β)M = T.
⇒: If αM = T and βM = F then (α⇒ β)M = F.
Otherwise, (α⇒ β)M = T.
⇔: If αM = βM then (α⇔ β)M = T.
If αM 6= βM then (α⇔ β)M = F.
Thus given a wff, one can simply find a parsing sequence and apply one
of the above rules at each step.
Example 2.44 Find the truth value of ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t) for a model M
where pM = T, qM = F, rM = F, sM = T, and tM = F. To do this, we use
the parsing sequence found in example 2.32, and evaluate the truth value at
each step.
1: pM = T, qM = F, rM = F, sM = T, and tM = F by hypothesis.
2: (s ∨ t)M = T by ∨ and 1.
3: (¬p)M = F by ¬ and 1.
4: (¬p ∧ q)M = F by ∧, 1, and 3.
5: (r ∨ (s ∨ t))M = T by ∨, 1, and 2.
6: (¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t))M = F by ⇔, 4, and 5.
Consider the same wff in another model where pM and qM are switched.
Example 2.45 Find the truth value of ¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t) for a model M
where pM = F, qM = T, rM = F, sM = T, and tM = F. With the same
parsing sequence, evaluating the truth values gives:
1: pM = F, qM = T, rM = F, sM = T, and tM = F by hypothesis.
2: (s ∨ t)M = T by ∨ and 1.
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3: (¬p)M = T by ¬ and 1.
4: (¬p ∧ q)M = T by ∧, 1, and 3.
5: (r ∨ (s ∨ t))M = T by ∨, 1, and 2.
6: (¬p ∧ q ⇔ r ∨ (s ∨ t))M = T by ⇔, 4, and 5.
Theorem 2.46 Let α be a wff in a model M . Then the truth value αM is the
same for all parsing sequences of α.
Proof: This theorem establishes that every wff has a unique truth
value, and can be proven by induction on the length of wffs. Let α be a wff of
length n. If n = 0, then α is a simple wff, i.e. a simple proposition, and has a
1 step parsing sequence. Thus, there can be only a single truth value for this
parsing sequence. Assume any wff of length n or less has the same truth value
for every parsing sequence (i.e., its truth value is unique) and consider the wff
α of length n+ 1. Then either α = (¬β) or α = (β1 ∗ β2), where ∗ is a binary
connective.
Case 1: α = (¬β). Then β is of length at most n and, thus by induction
hypothesis, has the same truth value for each of its parsing sequences. The
parsing sequence for α is found by adding the same single step to any parsing
sequence for β, and therefore must have the same truth value in every parsing
sequence for α.
Case 2: α = (β1 ∗ β2). By theorem 2.40, ∗ is the main connective of
α and thus occurs in the last step of the parsing sequence for α. Now β1 and
β2 have lengths at most n and therefore, by the induction hypothesis, have
the same truth value for each of their parsing sequences. Thus, as ∗ occurs in
the last step of the parsing sequence for α, and β1 and β2 have unique truth
values, by definition 2.43, α must also have a unique truth value.
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Thus, by induction, the truth value of a wff is the same for all of its
parsing sequences.
Definition 2.47 A model M models, or satisfies, a wff α if αM = T. M
models a set of wffs H, if M satisfies every wff in H. These are denoted
M |= α and M |= H, respectively.
Conversely, one can say M does not model a wff α if αM = F and
denote this by M 2 α. Rules for a wff satisfying a model M are given below.
Proposition 2.48 If M is a model and α and β are wffs, then:
¬¬: If M |= ¬¬α, then M |= α.
∧: If M |= (α ∧ β), then M |= α and M |= β,
¬∧: If M |= ¬(α ∧ β), then M |= ¬α or M |= ¬β.
∨: If M |= (α ∨ β), then either M |= α or M |= β.
¬∨: If M |= ¬(α ∨ β), then M |= ¬α and M |= ¬β.
⇒: If M |= (α⇒ β), then either M |= ¬α or M |= β.
¬ ⇒: If M |= ¬(α⇒ β), then either M |= α or M |= ¬β.
⇔: If M |= (α⇔ β), then either M |= (α ∧ β) or M |= ¬(α ∧ β).
¬ ⇔: If M |= ¬(α⇔ β), then M |= ¬(α⇒ β) or M |= ¬(β ⇒ α).
Proof: The reasoning for this proposition follows from definition 2.43
and 2.47. For example, M |= ¬¬α means (¬¬α)M = T, so by 2.43, (¬α)M = F
and thus αM = T so M |= α. Likewise, M |= (α∧β) means (α∧β)M = T and
thus αM = βM = T so M |= α and M |= β. ¬∧ and ¬∨ follow from similar
reasoning and DeMorgan’s Laws. The reasoning for the rest is much the same
and is left to the reader.
However, as the number of component propositions in a wff increases,
the complexity of finding its truth value in a model does as well. As this
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evaluation is straightforward, the process and proof of a truth value can be
arranged into table form. The alternate problem of finding a model which
satisfies a wff, that is, makes it true, can also be solved via table form.
2.5 Truth Tables
Truth tables are a easy way to organize and easily review the truth values
of wffs in various models. As the various propositions under consideration
increase, the number of possible models grows even quicker. For a single
proposition p, there are only two possible models, one in which p is true and
one in which it is false. For two propositions p and q, the number of models
double:
pM1 = T, qM1 = T
pM2 = T, qM2 = F
pM3 = F, qM3 = T
pM4 = F, qM4 = F
Similarly, a third proposition r again doubles the number of models:
pM1 = T, qM1 = T, rM1 = T
pM2 = T, qM2 = F, rM2 = T
pM3 = F, qM3 = T, rM3 = T
pM4 = F, qM4 = F, rM4 = T
pM5 = T, qM5 = T, rM5 = F
pM6 = T, qM6 = F, rM6 = F
pM7 = F, qM7 = T, rM7 = F
pM8 = F, qM8 = F, rM8 = F
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As the number of models grow it becomes difficult to track various
truth values. Truth tables alleviate some of this difficulty, providing a visual
summary that is easily understood and ensures that every possible model has
been considered. The above models for the two and three part propositions
are dipicted as tables below:
p q
M1 T T
M2 T F
M3 F T
M4 F F
p q r
M1 T T T
M2 T F T
M3 F T T
M4 F F T
M5 T T F
M6 T F F
M7 F T F
M8 F F F
The sentential connectives can also be easily organized into truth table
form, as evidenced below.
p ¬p
T F
F T
p q p ∧ q p ∨ q p⇒ q p⇔ q
T T T T T T
T F F T F F
F T F T T F
F F F F T T
Example 2.49 Consider ((p ∨ q) ∧ (r ⇒ s)). Evaluating this wff for all 16
models would be onerous. It would be easy to skip a model without realizing
it or confuse truth values when switching from model to model. With its
truth table below, however, every aspect of every model is laid out and easy
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to reference.
p q r s p ∨ q r ⇒ s ((p ∨ q) ∧ (r ⇒ s))
T T T T T T T
T T T F T F F
T T F T T T T
T T F F T T T
T F T T T T T
T F T F T F F
T F F T T T T
T F F F T T T
F T T T T T T
F T T F T F F
F T F T T T T
F T F F T T T
F F T T F T F
F F T F F F F
F F F T F T F
F F F F F T F
The models which satisify ((p ∨ q) ∧ (r ⇒ s)) are those in which its
truth value is true. For example, the model where pM = qM = rM = sM = T
satisfies the wff. Similarly, the model where pM = qM = sM = T and rM = F
satisifies the wff.
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Example 2.50 Consider DeMorgan’s laws which state that the negation of
a conjunction is the disjunction of the negations (¬(p ∨ q) ⇔ (¬p ∧ ¬q))
and that the negation of a disjunction is the conjunction of the negations
(¬(p∧q)⇔ (¬p∨¬q)). Both laws can be organized into truth tables as shown
below.
p q ¬p ¬q p ∨ q ¬(p ∨ q) (¬p ∧ ¬q) ¬(p ∨ q)⇔ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
T T F F T F F T
T F F T T F F T
F T T F T F F T
F F T T F T T T
p q ¬p ¬q p ∧ q ¬(p ∧ q) (¬p ∨ ¬q) ¬(p ∧ q)⇔ (¬p ∨ ¬q)
T T F F T F F T
T F F T F T T T
F T T F F T T T
F F T T F T T T
The last column of both tables indicate the laws hold in every model
(every model satisfies the laws). When this happens, it is reffered to as a
tautology.
Definition 2.51 A wff α is called a tautology if it is true in every model,
i.e. M |= α for every model M .
To check whether a wff α is a tautology, create a truth table which
evaluates the truth value of α for every model.
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Example 2.52 Are either of the wffs ((p∨ q)⇒ (q∧p)) or ((q∧p)⇒ (p∨ q))
tautologies?
p q (p ∨ q) (q ∧ p) ((p ∨ q)⇒ (q ∧ p)) ((q ∧ p)⇒ (p ∨ q))
T T T T T T
T F T F F T
F T T F F T
F F F F T T
It is evident from the truth table that the wff ((p ∨ q) ⇒ (q ∧ p))
is false in two models and so is not a tautology. However the second wff
((q ∧ p)⇒ (p ∨ q)) is true in every model and thus is a tautology.
A truth table which gives a tautology can also show whether the rea-
soning which comprises a proof, also called an argument form, is justifiable.
For example, modus ponens and modus tollens are argument forms which are
tautologies. Modus ponens, which is latin for “the way that affirms by affirm-
ing,” states that if the statement p ⇒ q is true, and if p is true, then q must
be true as well. For example, consider the compound proposition “If I don’t
work, then I don’t have any money,.” If the statement and its antecedent are
both true, then so is the consequent “I don’t have any money.” Modus ponens
is also implicit in many mathematical proofs, including those in this chapter.
For example, in theorem 2.46, it was reasoned ∗ was the main connective of
α = (β1 ∗ β2) by the following modus ponens argument:
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p: α = (β1 ∗ β2)
q: ∗ is the main connective of α = (β1 ∗ β2)
p⇒ q: α = (β1 ∗ β2) implies ∗ is the main connective of α = (β1 ∗ β2)
p: True by case assumption.
p⇒ q: True by theorem 2.40.
q: True by modus ponens.
On the other hand, modus tollens, which is latin for “the way that
denies by denying,” states that if a statement p ⇒ q is true, and q is false,
then p is false as well. For example, Let p be the proposition “a+b is odd” and
q the proposition “a is odd or b is odd, but not both.” Then, if p⇒ q: “If a+b
is odd then a is odd or b is odd, but not both” is true, but q is false, then p is
false as well. Thus if a and b are both odd or both we can conclude a + b is
even. Both modus ponens and modus tollens can be proven via a truth table.
Example 2.53 Proof of modus ponens and modus tollens.
Modus Ponens ((p⇒ q) ∧ p)⇒ q
p q p⇒ q ((p⇒ q) ∧ p) ((p⇒ q) ∧ p)⇒ q
T T T T T
T F F F T
F T T F T
F F T F T
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Modus Tollens ((p⇒ q) ∧ ¬q)⇒ ¬p
p q ¬p ¬q (p⇒ q) ((p⇒ q) ∧ ¬q) (((p⇒ q) ∧ ¬q)⇒ ¬p)
T T F F T F T
T F F T F F T
F T T F T F T
F F T T T T T
Example 2.54 Proof that an implication and its contrapositive are equiva-
lent, i.e., (α⇒ β)↔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α) is a tautology.
α β ¬α ¬β (α⇒ β) (¬β ⇒ ¬α) (α⇒ β)↔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α)
T T F F T T T
T F F T F F T
F T T F T T T
F F T T T T T
Although truth tables provide a valid proof for wffs of sentential logic,
they are not applicable in a multi-variable setting where the truth value of a
statement is dependent upon numerous changing values. Sentential logic fails
to encompass such variable statements as well as verbiage like there exists and
for all. Therefore it is necessary to expand our consideration to first order
logic and its main component, the predicate.
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2.6 Examples
At the end of each chapter, examples of concepts at work in the ax-
iomatic systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, group theory, and Peano
Arithmetic will be explored (though other instances of examples in the systems
may occur elsewhere in the chapter as well).
Definition 2.55 An axiomatic system is an collection of wffs which are as-
sumed to be true and from which the truth value of other wffs can be derived.
Such wffs with assumed but unproven truth values are called axioms,
which comes from the greek ‘axioma’ meaning “to deem worthy” or “to re-
quire.” Axioms, also commonly referred to as postulates or assumptions, can-
not be proven from one another unless superfluous. Any true wff which can
be obtained from the axioms via an accepted form of proof (e.g., truth tables
and later tableaus) are called thoerems. The collection of all such theorems
is is the theory of the system.
Sentential logic can be axiomatized, that is, be presented in the form of
an axiomatic system, in numerous different ways, each still using (some of, but
not neccessarily all) the symbols of the sentential logic language developed in
this chapter. For instance, there is an axiomatization where wffs are defined
as follows:
• Any proposition p, q, etc is a wff.
• If α and β are wffs, then (α⇒ β) and (¬α) are wffs.
• Nothing else is a wff
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Any wff in one of the following forms is an axiom, where α, β, and γ are
wffs:
1. α⇒ (β ⇒ α)
2. (α⇒ (β ⇒ γ))⇒ ((α⇒ β)⇒ (α⇒ γ))
3. (¬β ⇒ ¬α)⇒ ((¬β ⇒ α)⇒ β)
And there is a rule of inference, modus ponens where, if α and (α ⇒ β) are
theorems, β is also a theorem.
Note that, although the axioms come in one of three forms (or“axiom
schema”), there are an infinite number of them. A complete explanation of
this axiomatic sentential logic could last another forty pages and there are
many sources which can give an indepth analysis, so a complete explanation
of these axioms will not be included here. However, an illustration of how
theorems such as α⇒ α can be derived from the axioms using modus ponens
will be provided:
1. α⇒ ((α⇒ α)⇒ α)
by axiom 1 where β = (α⇒ α).
2. (α⇒ ((α⇒ α)⇒ α))⇒ ((α⇒ (α⇒ α))⇒ (α⇒ α))
by axiom 2 where β = (α⇒ α) and γ = α.
3. (α⇒ (α⇒ α))⇒ (α⇒ α)
by 1, 2 and modus ponens.
4. α⇒ (α⇒ α)
by axiom 1 where β = α.
5. α⇒ α
by 3, 4, and modus ponens.
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It is also possible to move between the ‘natural-deduction’ system of
sentential logic described in this chapter and this axiomatic one. If (α ∧ β)
is defined to be ¬(α ⇒ ¬β), then ∧ is understood to act as defined earlier in
this chapter. This is especially evident as a truth table shows an equivalence
between the two produces a tautology.
α β ¬β α⇒ ¬β ¬(α⇒ ¬β) α ∧ β (¬(α⇒ ¬β))⇔ α ∧ β
T T F F T T T
T F T T F F T
F T F T F F T
F F T T F F T
There are numerous ways in which to express the sentential connectives:
solely in terms of ¬ and ⇒, or ¬ and ∧, or ¬ and ∨, or even with the single
operation α|β, known as the Scheffer Stroke, which is equivalent to ¬α ∨ ¬β.
A full description of the possible axiomatizations and various ways of defining
connectives could fill its own thesis, but as sentential logic is merely a building
block and not the focus, we will leave further study of these concepts up to
the reader.
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, abbreviated ZF, is an axiomatic system
which gives a theory for sets that avoid the paradoxes of naive set theory (recall
example 2.5). It was the creation of German mathematician Ernst Friedrich
Ferdinand Zermela and Israeli (though German-born) Abraham Halevi Fraenkel,
the former which introduced it in 1908 and the latter which expounded upon
it during the 1920s. ZF consists of eight axioms (though other sources may
count differently). The addition of the famous, and originally controversial
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(in 1908), Axiom of Choice creates ZFC, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the
Axiom of Choice.
Group theory is the study of groups (sets with an associated binary
operation) whose binary operations satisfy four axioms: closure, associativity,
identity, and inverse. Group theory originates from three sources, including
the theory of algebraic equations and number theory at the end of the 18th
century, and geometry at the beginning of the 19th. In the theory of algebraic
equations, mathematicians such as Joseph-Louis Lagrange and, later, E´variste
Galois studied the permutations of the roots of equations, permutations which
are now considered to be elements of a group. In number theory, Leonhard
Euler explored the group properties of the remainders on division of powers
an by a fixed prime p while Carl Gauss analyzed the group properties of the
composition of equivalence classes of quadratics of the form ax2 + 2bxy + cy2.
Giuseppe Peano was a 19th century Italian mathematician who intro-
duced a set of axioms he believed exemplified the natural numbers. A formal
version of his postulates were published in 1889 in The Principles of Arith-
metic, Presented by a New Method. These Peano axioms are often called
the Dedekind-Peano axioms as they are actually a more strictly formulated
version of those given by Richard Dedekind in 1888. These axioms, in con-
junction with axioms defining the symbols + and ·, form Peano Arithmetic,
often abbreviated PA.
However, the axioms of these three systems, ZF, Group Theory, and
PA, are expressed in terms of first order logic, using concepts which do not
exist in sentential logic. Thus it is necessary to consider first order logic before
these axioms can be given.
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Chapter 3
First Order Logic
First order logic is an expansion of sentential logic which includes new
symbols such as variables, parameters, predicates, and quantifiers. First order
logic is also a two-valued logic, but rather than propositions being mapped to
the set {T,F}, predicates have associated sets of ordered elements which can
be mapped to {T,F} in the form of n-ary relations. The symbols of first order
logic can be combined according to certain rules of formation to create wffs.
The Unique Readability Theorem expands in this chapter to include first order
logic and prove that every first order logic wff has a unique truth value when
a specific ordered element is considered. It will be shown the truth values of
these wffs are determined by the model in which they are evaluated.
3.1 An Introduction to First Order Logic
First order logic, or pure predicate logic, is a formal language with an
infinite number of symbols that are classified as either logical or non-logical.
The logical symbols include variables, connectives, parenthesis, and quanti-
fiers while parameters, predicates, and functions are considered non-logical
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symbols. A verbal description will be given of these terms and later clarified
using the idea of mapping.
Definition 3.1 A variable is a symbol which corresponds to a term, value,
or individual which may change within the confines of a given statement. A
parameter is a specific symbol that corresponds to a term, value, or individual
which does not vary within a statement.
Thus a parameter is simply a set variable. Syntactically speaking, the
only difference between the two is that while a variable may appear directly
after a quantifier (defined later) in a wff, a parameter may not. It is standard
form for mathematicians to use the first letters of the alphabet, such as a, b,
and c to stand for constants, or parameters, while letters at the end, x, y, and
z, indicate variables. Subscripts are often used to indicate (but not explicitely)
a relation between symbols.
Example 3.2 Consider the parameters and variables of the following state-
ments.
♦ Olympia is in Washington State.
♦ Today is Christmas.
♦ 2 = 1
♦ x = y
♦ ax2 + bx+ c
In the first sentence, both Olympia and Washington State are specific
terms needed to understand the sentence and are thus parameters. In the
second sentence, Christmas is also a parameter but Today is a variable as it
changes depending on time and even location; on the other side of the globe
‘today’ takes a different value.
41
For the expression 2 = 1, both 2 and 1 are parameters, but in x = y
both x and y are variables. The final line gives a general quadratic function.
Here it is understood the unkown x is the variable but a, b, and c are parameters
which determine which quadratic f(x) is.
Letters such as p, q, and r were used in sentential logic to indicate
propositions. These characters are capitalized in first order logic to specify a
predicate.
Definition 3.3 A predicate P (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is a statement with n variables
(n ≥ 0) and a truth value when its variables are known. In other words, when
a predicate’s variables are replaced by parameters, it becomes a proposition.
Note that when n = 0 a predicate is a statement with no variables and
a truth value, i.e., a proposition.
Example 3.4 Which of the following statments are predicates?
♦ x is an even number.
♦ x+ y = z
♦ The price of canned tuna is fifty cents
♦ Madagascar is an island.
The first sentence is from example 2.2. There, the variable x prevented
the sentence from being a proposition. However, when x is replaced by a
parameter, the sentence does have a truth value and thus is a predicate. The
second sentence has three variables x, y and z, while the third contains the
variable price of canned tuna. When each of these variables are defined, each
sentence has a truth value and thus each is a predicate. The final sentence is
an example of a predicate with no variables, that is, a proposition.
42
Note the truth values of these predicates, when their variables are de-
termined, is also dependent upon the universe of discourse. Is x+ y = z being
evaluated using standard arithmetic or modulo 4? Is the price of canned tuna
is fifty cents, evaluated based on the pricing at Safeway or Walmart? This
ambiguity will be addressed in the next section. Until then, the universe in
which a predicate is considered will be the “obvious” one.
The xi’s of a predicate P (x1, x2, · · · , xn) are understood to stand for the
variables of the predicate. A predicate with three variables, such as x+ y = z,
is often symbolized by P (x, y, z). If these variables become parameters a, b,
and c, the former predicate (now propositions) will be denoted by P (a, b, c).
Similarly, a predicate may be written P (x1, x2, · · · , xn, p1, p2, · · · , pm) when
m predicates have been substituted by parameters pi or to simply indicate
a dependence of the predicate on a parameter. For example, the predicate
P (x, y) : x + y = 0 may alternatively be written as P (x, y, 0). For conve-
nience sake, a predicate is occasionaly written P (x) (often when the number
of variables is unknown) or Pn, where n is the number of variables.
Definition 3.5 The arity of a predicate P (x1, x2, ..., xn) is the number of
variables under consideration.
Thus the arity of P (x1, x2, · · · , xn, p1, p2, · · · , pm) is n as every pi is a
paramter. Similarly, the arity of P (x, y, z) is three, but the arity of P (x, y, 0)
is two.
Example 3.6 Consider the arity of the predicate 0 =
∑n
i=1 xi, where xi is a
real number.
n = 1: The 1-ary, or unary form of the predicate where 0 = x1
n = 2: The 2-ary, or binary, form of the predicate where 0 = x1 + x2
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n = 3: The 3-ary, or ternary, form of the predicate where 0 = x1+x2+x3...
n = n: The n-ary form of the predicate where 0 = x1 + x2 + ...+ xn
There is a joke that “escalators never break; they simply become stairs.”
The first order logic counterpart to this is that “predicates never have defined
variables; they simply become propositions.” Assigning values to a predicate’s
variables create a proposition, but a predicate also becomes a proposition by
quantifing those variables.
Definition 3.7 The existential quantifier, denoted by the symbol ∃, gives
the expression ∃xP (x) a true truth value when there is at least one a which
makes the predicate P (a) a true proposition and a false truth value otherwise.
The existential quantifier ∃ is read as there exists or for some. For
a variable x, ∃x means there is at least one object x in the universe under
consideration. When ∃xP (x) is true, it is usually read as either there exists x
such that P(x) or for some x, P(x).
Example 3.8 The following are examples of predicates that have had their
variables quantified by the existential quantifier and are now propositions.
♦ There exists a graduate student who has written a thesis
about Go¨del’s Theorems.
♦ ∃x∃y(x = 2y).
♦ There exists an even number which is odd.
As long as one instance of the quantified variable is true, the entire
proposition is true. In the above example, this implies the first two proposi-
tions are true (as the first one is verified by this thesis) while the last is false.
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Realize though, that if the second predicate had been quantifed as ∃x(x = 2y)
it would remain a predicate..
The existential quantifier’s counterpart in sententiall logic is the iter-
ated conjunction. This means if x is an element of a potentially infinite set
{a1, a2, · · · , an, · · · }, then ∃xP (x) is equivalent to the multiple conjunction
P (a1) ∧ P (a2) ∧ · · · ∧ P (an) ∧ · · · . This is especially evident when x can only
take a finite number of values. For example, if x is one of the fifty states of
the U.S. and P (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is the proposition “x is landlocked”, then
(∃xP (x) ⇔ (P (Alabama) ∨ P (Alaska) ∨ ... ∨ P (Wyoming)). Alternatively
stated, “There exists a state which is landlocked” is equivalent to “Alabama or
Alaska or ... or Wyoming is landlocked.”
Definition 3.9 The universal quantifier, denoted by the symbol ∀, gives
the expression ∀xP (x) a true truth value when every a makes the predicate
P (a) a true propositions. It is false otherwise.
The universal quantifier is read as for all or every. For a variable x, ∀x
means for all objects x in the universe under consideration. When ∀xP (x) is
true, it is usually read as for all x, P(x) or for every x, P(x).
Example 3.10 The following are examples of predicates that have had their
variables quantified by the universal quantifier and are now propositions.
♦ Every graduate student has written about Go¨del’s Theorems.
♦ ∀x∀y(x = 2y).
♦ Every even number is divisible by 2.
If even one quantified variable fails to be true, then the entire proposi-
tion is false. Thus the first two propositions are false and the last true. Again,
if the second predicate had been quantified ∀x(x = 2y), it would remain a
predicate.
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The iterated disjunction is sentential logic’s counterpart to the universal
quantifier. Here, when x is an element of a potentially infinite set
{a1, a2, · · · , an, · · · }, ∀xP (x) is equivalent to P (a1)∧P (a2)∧· · ·∧P (xn)∧· · · .
If x is month and P (x) is the proposition “x has at least 28 days” then
(∀xP (x) ⇔ (P (Jan) ∧ P (Feb) ∧ ... ∧ P (Dec)). This can be also interpreted
“Every month has at least 28 days” is equivalent to “January and February
and ... and December all have at least 28 days.”
The connectives of sentential logic are integrated easily into first order
logic, with the negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication, and equivalence
of predicates rather than propositions. These connectives allow equivalences
such as (∀xP (x)⇔ ¬∃x(¬P (x)) and (∃xP (x)⇔ ¬∀x(¬P (x)).
The quantification of variables also allows expressions such as DeMor-
gan’s laws to translate into first order logic.
Example 3.11 In first order logic, DeMorgan’s Laws are expressed using
quantifiers rather than connectives. ¬(p ∨ q)⇔ (¬p ∧ ¬q) becomes
¬∃xP (x) ⇔ ∀x¬P (x). Verbally, this says “there is no x which makes P(x)
true,” is equivalent to “P(x) is false for every x.” DeMorgan’s other law
¬(p ∧ q) ⇔ (¬p ∨ ¬q), becomes ¬∀xP (x) ⇔ ∃x¬P (x), which says “not all
x make P(x) true,” is equivalent to “there is some x for which P(x) is false.”
A finite example helps illustrate DeMorgan’s laws. Suppose P (x) is a
predicate and x is a variable which can only be replaced by a parameter from
the set {a1, a2, a3}. Then DeMorgan’s laws state ¬∃xP (x)⇔ ∀x¬P (x) is
¬(P (a1) ∨ P (a2) ∨ P (a3))⇔ (¬P (a1) ∧ ¬P (a2) ∧ ¬P (a3))
and ¬∀xP (x)⇔ ∃x¬P (x) is
¬(P (a1) ∧ P (a2) ∧ P (a3))⇔ (¬P (a1) ∨ ¬P (a2) ∨ ¬P (a3)).
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Example 3.12 The barber puzzle of example 2.6 can be stated in first order
logic by using quantifiers. Recall that this puzzle states that there is a town
with only one male barber who shaves only those men who do not shave
themselves. Let x and y be variables that take the value of any man in town,
B(x) be the predicate which claims x is a barber, and S(x, y) the predicate
which states that x shaves y. Then the barber puzzle can be written
∃x(B(x) ∧ ∀y(¬S(y, y)⇔ S(x, y))
The paradox is evident; the universal quantifier ∀ includes every y, man in
town, including x, the barber. Thus when x = y, ¬S(y, y) ⇔ S(y, y), an
obvious impossibility.
Quantifiers are often implied but not explicitly mentioned. The com-
mutative property is often stated a ∗ b = b ∗ a but is, in actuality,
∀a∀b, a ∗ b = b ∗ a. Other expressions, such as x+ x2 = 0 imply the existential
quantifier and are written ∃x, x+ x2 = 0.
The propositions of sentential logic are described as simple and com-
pound by their connective components. In first order logic, predicates are also
labelled by the presence of quantifiers and connectives.
Definition 3.13 A compound predicate is a predicate with at least one
connective or quantifier while a simple predicate is a predicate without
them.
Example 3.14 Consider the following:
P(x): x2 + x = 0
P(x, y, z): ∀y((2x− z = 3y) ∧ (2z + y = 3x))
P(n): ∃n(n ∈ N)
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The first expression P (x) is a simple predicate. The second sentence
P (x, y, z) is a compound predicate as it uses a conjunction and the universal
quantifier. The third, P (n), is a trick question; there is a existential quantifier,
but that same quantifier makes P (n) a proposition. However an altered P (n)
such as P (m,n) : ∃n((m+ n) ∈ N) is a compound predicate.
The syllabary of first order logic thus includes the symbols of sentential
logic and the addition of variables, parameters, predicates and quantifiers.
Predicates do not have truth values as propositions do, but they can gain them
when their variables are substituted for parameters or they are quantified.
Therefore, to avoid any ambiguity surrounding the potential truth value of a
predicate, the next section strictly define how predicates can be construed.
3.2 First Order Logic as a Relation
Predicates, like propositions, can be misinterpreted as English language
sentences. Consider the statement “Barack Obama is the president.” Is this a
proposition or a predicate? “Barack Obama” seems to refer to a specific indi-
vidual, but there may be other men who have the same name. Is “president”
referring to an elected office of the United States or the person who holds it?
As an office it is a parameter, as a person, a variable. Either way, there is not
just a question of whether the sentence is a predicate, but also of the truth
value it would have as a proposition.
Quantifiers can obscure the meaning of predicates which are English
language sentences as well. Consider the predicates P (x): “x is perfect” and
Q(y): “y is nobody,” where x and y are any person, i.e. x and y are ‘someone.’
Then ¬∃xP (x) is “There does not exist a person who is perfect,” or “Nobody
48
is perfect,” either equally valid in english. Thus ¬∃xP (x) ∧ Q(y) is “Nobody
is perfect and someone is nobody.” The verbal wording draws the conclusion
“someone is perfect,” i.e. P (y), which is patently impossible in first order logic,
where this is (¬∃xP (x) ∧ Q(y)) ⇒ P (y)). Examination reveals the confusion
arises from the use of ‘nobody’ as both a noun and a pronoun, the former
meaning ‘no person‘ and the latter ‘a person of no importance.’
Thus new definitions and redefining old ones for first order logic is vital.
Definition 3.15 A predicate P (x1, x2, ..., xn) or Pn is a symbol.
A predicate is merely an element of the first order logic syllabary. When
an n-ary relation is assigned to a predicate symbol, the relation creates an
affiliation between the predicate’s variables and the predicate resembles the
description given by definition 3.3 (the truth value determined by this relation
will be formalized at the end of the section).
Definition 3.16 An n-ary relation PUn on some non-empty set U is a subset
PUn ⊆ Un, Un = {(x1, x2, ..., xn) : x1, x2, ..., xn ∈ U}.
A 1-ary relation PU1 is also called a unary relation and is a subset of
U1 = U . A 2-ary, or binary, relation PU2 is a subset of U
2 = U×U and a 3-ary,
ternary, relation PU3 is a subset of U
3 = U × U × U . The capital letter U is
used because it indicates the ‘universe’ under discussion for an n-ary relation.
The letter D is also often used because the subset corresponds to the ‘domain’
of discourse. The elements of this universe are the parameters described in the
previous section. The universe U can be varied, from the natural numbers to
vector spaces to geography. The universe can be finite or infinite, countable
or uncountable. Examples 3.17 through 3.22 give various n-ary relations on
the specified universe.
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Example 3.17 The simplest interpretation of an n-ary relation is as some
set. If U = R, the following are n-ary relations on U .
PR1 = {6, pi, 10004,
√
2}
QR1 = {...,−4,−2, 0, 2, 4, ...}
RR2 = {(3, 0)}
SR3 = {(1, 2,−3), (pi, 2,−3), (1, 2, 13), (pi, 2, 13)}
TRn = ∅ (Any n-ary relation may simply be the empty set)
Often such n-ary relations are written in set builder notation
{(x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Un : condition} to avoid listing a potentially infinite number
of elements of Un. In this manner, QR1 can be written as {x ∈ R : x is
even}. Similarly, in this notation, any parameters given by the relation can
be expressed. In SR3 , 2 is parameter (it remains fixed), thus S
R
3 = {(x, 2, y) :
x ∈ {1, pi} ∧ y ∈ {−3, 1
3
}}. However, note that SR3 corresponds to a ternary
predicate S3 = S(x, y, z) rather than a binary predicate S(x, 2, z).
Example 3.18 Let U = Z. The following are n-ary relations on U .
P Z1 = {x ∈ Z : x > 0}
QZ2 = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 : x+ y is odd }
RZ3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ Z3 : x < y < z}
Example 3.19 Let U = C. The following are n-ary relations on U .
PC1 = {x ∈ C : ||x|| = 0}
QC2 = {(x, y) ∈ C2 : x and y are real }
RC3 = {(x, y, i) ∈ C3 : x+ y = i}
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Example 3.20 Let U = {the states of the United States of America}. The
following are n-ary relations on U .
PU1 = {x ∈ U : x is an island}
QU2 = {(x, y) ∈ U2 : x has more land than y}
RU3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ U3 x borders both y and z}
Example 3.21 Let U be the constructed formal languge of example 2.24.
The following are n-ary relations on U .
PU1 = {x ∈ U : x begins with ‘c’}
PU2 = {(x, y) ∈ U2 : x and y contain the same symbols}
PU3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ U3: x, y, and z contain only one symbol in common}
Example 3.22 Let U = R. The following are n-ary relations on U
PR1 = {x1 ∈ R : 0 = x1}
PR2 = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 : 0 = x1 + x2}
PR3 = {(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 : 0 = x1 + x2 + x3}
...
PRn = {(x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Rn : 0 = x1 + x2 + ...+ xn}
This example may seem familiar; it is from example 3.6 where the ar-
ity of the predicate 0 =
∑n
i=1 xi was being discussed. This is because every
predicate given in that previous example had the above implied n-ary relation
assigned to it. N-ary relations create relationships between the n variables of a
predicate that can (but not necessarily should) be expressed as an english lan-
guage sentence. The following two examples show how various n-ary relations
on a set U can be assigned to predicates (such assignments will be addressed
again in section 3.6).
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Example 3.23 Let U = {2, 3} Then the unary relations are {2}, {3}, {2, 3},
and ∅. Below are examples of predicates in U , each assigned one of the possible
unary relations, and statements which could express the relation.
P1 → PU1 = {2}: The set of even numbers from U, {x ∈ U : x 6= 3}
Q1 → QU1 = {3}: {x ∈ U : x is odd}
R1 → RU1 = {2, 3}: The set of prime numbers in U, {x ∈ U}
S1 → SU1 = ∅: The set of imaginary numbers in U
Notation: The number 1 can be dropped on a unary relations PU1 as it
is with predicates with only one variable, i.e., P1 → PU1 is often just P → PU .
Binary predicates can be assigned binary relations as well. (Note that
unlike above, not all possible relations are listed).
P2 → PU2 = {(2, 2)}: The size and the lowest number of U
Q2 → QU2 = {(2, 2), (3, 3)} : {(x, y) ∈ U2 : x = y}
R2 → RU2 = {(2, 2), (3, 2)} : {(x, 2) ∈ U2}
S2 → SU2 = {(2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 3)} : {(x, y) ∈ U2 : (x+y) ∈ {4, 5, 6}}
N-ary relations allow n-ary predicates to have clear and non-subjective
truth values. If Pn = P (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is a predicate in a universe U with
a n-ary assignment PUn , then P (a1, a2, · · · , an) is T if (a1, a2, · · · , an) ∈ PUn
and F if (a1, a2, · · · , an) 6∈ PUn , where every (a1, a2, · · · , an) ∈ Un. Thus if
PUn = ∅, P (a1, a2, · · · , an) is false for every ordered element (a1, a2, · · · , an) as
the empty set contains no elements. Similarly, if PUn = U
n, P (a1, a2, · · · , an)
is true for every ordered element (a1, a2, · · · , an), as Un contains every possible
element.
Although none of the prior examples show an 0-ary relation, they do
exist. As PU0 ⊆ U0 = {()} where U0 is the set containing the empty string, PU0
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can only be of two forms; the set containing the empty string, {()}, and the
empty set, ∅. Thus if PU0 = ∅, P0 = P () is false and if PU0 = {()}, P0 = P () is
true. This natural mapping from {()} to the truth value T and from ∅ to the
truth value F is reasonable as PU0 is assigned to the predicate P0 which has
no variables and thus is a proposition. This means every proposition can be
written as a 0-ary predicate P0 whose truth value is determined by the 0-ary
relation PU0 .
Now that the truth value of a simple predicate is non-subjective, it is
time to consider the ways predicates can be combined and still have meaning;
that is, we must turn our attention to the syntax of first order logic and the
well-formed formula it creates.
3.3 Syntax
This chapter will focus on developing a formal grammer for first order
logic and showing how a parsing sequence proves whether or not a string of
first order logic is a wff. Parsing sequences will lay the stage for proving the
truth values of these wffs in later sections.
Definition 3.24 In first order logic a well-formed formula, or wff, is a
string which follows the syntax of first order logic, i.e. can be obtained by
applying a finite number of times the following rules of formation:
p: If p is a proposition in sentential logic, then p is a wff.
Pn: If Pn is an n-ary predicate then Pn is a wff.
¬: If α is a wff, then ¬α is a wff.
∧: If α and β are wffs, then (α ∧ β) is a wff.
∨: If α and β are wffs, then (α ∨ β) is a wff.
⇒: If α and β are wffs, then (α⇒ β) is a wff.
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⇔: If α and β are wffs, then (α⇔ β) is a wff.
∀: If α is a wff and x is a variable, then ∀xα is a wff.
∃: If α is a wff and x is a variable, then ∃xα is a wff.
Definition 3.25 A compound wff is a wff which uses at least one connective
or quantifier while a simple wff is a wff that does not use any.
Example 3.26 Consider the following:
1: P (x, y)
2: ∃xP (x, y)
2: ∃x∀yP (x, y)
The first expression, P (x, y), is a simple wff while the second ∃xP (x, y)
is a compound wff. The third, although all of its variables have been quantified,
is also a compound wff (the quantified variables creates a proposition).
Example 3.27 Find a parsing sequence for the string
(∃xP (x, y)⇒ (∀yP (x, y)⇔ q)), where P (x, y) is a predicate and q is a
proposition.
1: P (x, y) is a predicate by hypothesis and thus a wff by Pn.
2: q a proposition by hypothesis and thus a wff.
3: ∃xP (x, y) is a wff by ∃ and 1.
4: ∀yP (x, y) is a wff by by ∀ and 1.
5: (∀yP (x, y)⇔ q) is a wff by ⇔, 4, and 2.
6: (∃xP (x, y)⇒ (∀yP (x, y)⇔ q)) is wff by ⇒, 3, and 5.
Thus the string is a wff.
Example 3.28 Consider the parsing sequence for the string
∃x(P (x, y)⇒ ∀y(P (x, y)⇔ q)), where P (x, y) is a predicate and q a proposi-
tion.
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1: P (x, y) is a predicate by hypothesis and thus a wff by Pn.
2: q a proposition by hypothesis and thus a wffp.
3: (P (x, y)⇔ q) is a wff by ⇔, 2, and 1.
4: ∀y(P (x, y)⇔ q) is a wff by ∀ and 3.
5: (P (x, y)⇒ ∀y(P (x, y)⇔ q) is a wff by ⇒, 1 and 4
6: ∃x(P (x, y)⇒ ∀y(P (x, y)⇔ q)) is a wff by ∃.
Thus the string is a wff.
Although these strings differ in only the location of a few parenthesis,
their parsing sequences have different orders. While the main connnective of
example 3.27 was ⇒, the main connective of was ∃. This is indicative of the
importance of tracking parenthesis, especially around quantifiers and when
working with abbreviated wffs.
When evaluating abbreviated wffs, the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ have the
same importance as ¬ in the order of operations. When abbreviating a wff
which contains ∃xα or ∀xα, often parenthesis are added, rather than taken
away, to prevent confusion. For example, the abbreviated wff ∃xP (x)⇔ Q(y)
is (∃xP (x) ⇔ Q(y)) rather than ∃x(P (x) ∨ Q(y)). But these can easily be
confused, so often the abbreviation is written (∃xP (x)) ⇔ Q(y), with the
‘extra’ parenthesis.
3.4 Uniqueness of Truth Values
Before truth values can be assigned for wffs of first order logic, it is
necessary to prove every wff can only be interpreted one way. Although this
was shown for wffs of sentential logic, wffs of first order logic also include
predicates and quantifiers, so it is necessary to reprove the theorems of the
previous chapter.
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Theorem 3.29 Every wff is balanced.
Proof: Recall that a wff α is balanced if it has the same number of
left brackets as right brackets (definition 2.33). If α has lenth 0 it is the empty
string and hence balanced. If the length is 1, then α is either a proposition or
a predicate, both of which have no brackets and thus are balanced. Assume
every wff of length n or less is balanced and suppose α is a wff of length n+ 1.
Then either α = (¬β), α = (β1∗β2) where ∗ is a binary connective, or α = ∀xβ
or α = ∃xβ where β, β1 and β2 are wffs.
If α is of the first two forms, it is balanced by the reasoning of theorem
2.34. If α begins with a quantifier, β has length of less than n and is balanced.
α would not have any more parenthesis than β in this case, so α would also
be balanced. Thus, by induction, every wff of first order logic is balanced.
Theorem 3.30 Any string which is an initial part of a wff is not a wff.
Proof: If α has a length of 0 then it is an empty string and has no
initial part. If the length is 1, α must be either a predicate or a proposition and
would have no initial part. Assume that any initial part of a wff with length
at most n is not a wff and let α be a wff of length n+1. Then α = (¬β),
α = (β1 ∗ β2) where ∗ is a binary connective, α = ∀xβ, or α = ∃xβ, where β,
β1 and β2 are wffs. By the reasoning in theorem 2.37, no initial string of the
first two cases can be a wff, so it remains to consider the final cases.
Let s be an initial part of the wff α = ∀xβ and assume s is a wff. Then
α = st where t is not the empty string. s begins with a quantifier and is a wff,
so cannot be simply the strings ∀ or ∀x, but must be of the form ∀xs1 where
s1 is a wff. Then ∀xβ = ∀xs1t and removal of the first two symbols yields,
β = s1t. However, both of the wffs β and s1t have a length of less than n and
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thus cannot be initial parts of each other by the induction hypothesis. Hence,
as they begin at the same place within α, β = s1t. But this implies t is the
empty string and s is therfore not an initial part of the wff, a contradiction.
The reasoning for α = ∃xβ is the same, thus any string which is an
initial part of a wff is not a wff in first order logic.
Theorem 3.31 The Unique Readability Theorem: Every wff α which
begins with a left parenthesis has exactly one main connective.
Proof: This proof is identical to that given for sentential logic Unique
Readability Theorem, except that the wffs are now of first order logic. The
similarity of the proofs is reasonable as the first order logic wffs which are
formed from predicates or by quantifiers do not have parenthesis and thus are
not essential to the theorem.
Thus it is known every wff is uniquely interpreted and so every parsing
sequence of a wff gives the same truth value. However, before those truth
values can be determined, it is necessary to expound on the types of variables
which can occur in wffs.
3.5 Variables
Variable are essential to predicates; without them they are propositions.
A specific variable can occur numerous times in the same wff and in two
different capacities, “free” and “bound.” Each place in a wff where a symbol
or string is located is referred to as an occurence.
Definition 3.32 A bound variable or dummy variable x is a variable on
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which an expression does not depend, while a free variable x is a variable
which is not bound.
Free variables are those which, when replaced by parameters, determine
the truth value of a wff.
Example 3.33 In the following, y is a free variable.
♦ P (y)
♦ ∀xP (x, y)
♦
∫ ∞
−∞
xydx
Bound variables, on the other hand, can be replaced everywhere by
another variable y (where y does not occur elsewhere in the wff) without
affecting the potential truth value of a wff.
Example 3.34 In the following, x is a bound variable:
♦ ∃xP (x)
♦ ∀xP (x)
♦ ∃x such that 0 = 1 + x+ x2
♦ ¬∃xp(x)⇔ ∀x¬p(x) (DeMorgan’s Law)
♦ ∀xf(x, y)
Note that in DeMorgan’s Law, x actually stand for two different bound
variables. It is possible to separately substitute y and z for each bound instance
of x to obtain the (equivalent) ¬∃yp(y)⇔ ∀z¬p(z).
The action of replacing a bound variable x with another variable y in
a wff α is called a substitution of variables. However, problems arise when
the substitution of y causes a bound occurence when there should be a free
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one. For example, consider the true wff α : ∀x∃y(x + y > 0). Then when y
replaces x this becomes ∀y∃y(y + y > 0) or ∀y(y + y > 0) which is false. A
substitution which avoids this is referred to as a free substitution of variables
and is denoted by α(x//y). This notation can also indicate the replacement
of a variable by a parameter, (x//a). When every variable (x1, x2, · · · , xn)
is replaced by parameters (a1, a2, · · · , an), α((x1, x2, · · · , xn//a1, a2, · · · , an) is
called an instance of α.
Definition 3.35 Let α be a wff which begins with a quantifier. The scope
of that quantifier is α.
This means α is of the form Qxβ where Q is a quantifier, x a variable,
and β a wff. The scope of Q includes itself, x, and β.
Example 3.36 Consider the wff ∃x(∀yP (x, y, z)⇔ ∀zQ(x, y, z)). The scope
of the existential quantifier is the entire wff, including ∃x. The scope of the first
universal quantifier is ∀yP (x, y, z) while the scope of the second is ∀zQ(x, y, z).
The definitions of free and bound variables expand to include this no-
tion of scope. A bound variable occurs only in the scope of a quantifier which
has quantified it. A free variable is any variable which doesn’t.
Example 3.37 Consider the free and bound variables of the wff
α: ∃x(∀yP (x, y, z) ⇔ ∀zQ(x, y, z)) introduced in example 3.36. Every oc-
curence of x is bound, but while the first two occurrences of y in ∀yP (x, y, z)
are bound, the occurence of y in Q(x, y, z) is free. Conversely, the first oc-
curence of z in P (x, y, z) is free, but the last two in ∀zQ(x, y, z) are bound.
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Note that if the bound occurences of the variables x, y, and z were
replaced everywhere by some other variables such as u, v, and w, α retains
the same meaning : ∃u(∀vP (u, v, z)⇔ ∀wQ(u, y, w))
For the above example, each quantifier had only a single scope. But
is this always the case or is it possible for there to be multiple scopes for the
same quantifier or even no scope at all?
Theorem 3.38 The Unique Scope Theorem: There is a unique scope for
every occurence of a quantifier in a wff.
Proof: It is necessary first to prove the existence of a scope for a
quantifier before proving its uniqueness. Let α be a wff and Q a quantifier
which appears in α. As α is a wff, by the rules of formation, when Q occurs,
it must be in the form Qxβ where x is a variable and β a wff. But Qxβ is a
wff by the rules of formation, so Q has the scope Qxβ.
For uniqueness of this scope, let Q again be a specific quantifier which
appears in the wff α and suppose β1 and β2 are both wffs in α that begin with
Q. As β1 and β2 are both wffs which begin at Q, by theorem 3.30, neither can
be an initial part of the other, so β1 and β2 must be the same. Thus there is
only one scope for Q.
Given a n-ary relation on a predicate in a universe U , it is necessary to
know whether a variable is free or bound in that predicate to determine the
truth value of it. Such an assignment of an n-ary relation to a predicate is
referred to as a model, and is explored in the next section.
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3.6 Models
This section will focus on models and the criteria they provide to
determine the truth values of wffs of any universe U . Such wffs are written
using (but not limited to) connectives, quantifiers, predicates, parameters,
and variables. These symbols form the language L of U . L will be explored
further in the next section, though note that a model assigns meaning to those
symbols of L.
Definition 3.39 A model M of a non-empty set U (called the universe of the
model) is a system where every predicate Pn (and proposition P0) is assigned
an n-ary relation PUn .
Example 3.40 Consider example 3.23 where U = {2, 3}. If there are two
unary predicates P and Q and one binary predicate R2, then the unary re-
lations PU = {2} and QU = {3} and binary relation RU2 = {(2, 3)} make a
model. Any other combination of relations (such as PU = {3}, QU = ∅, and
RU2 = {(2, 2), (3, 3)}) gives another model.
Definition 3.41 To find the truth value αM of a wff α in a model M , simply
use the following rules:
Pn: If α is a predicate P (a1, a2, · · · , an), then αM = T iff
(a1, a2, · · · , an) ∈ PUn
¬: If αM = T then (¬α)M = F.
If αM = F then (¬α)M = T.
∧: If αM = T and βM = T then (α ∧ β)M = T.
Otherwise, (α ∧ β)M = F.
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∨: If αM = F and βM = F then (α ∨ β)M = F.
Otherwise, (α ∨ β)M = T.
⇒: If αM = T and βM = F then (α⇒ β)M = F.
Otherwise, (α⇒ β)M = T.
⇔: If αM = βM then (α⇔ β)M = T.
If αM 6= βM then (α⇔ β)M = F.
∀: (∀xα)M = T iff α(x//a)M for every a ∈ U .
∃: (∃xα)M = T iff α(x//a)M for at least one a ∈ U .
(Recall α(x//a) indicates every free variable x in α is being replaced
by the parameter a from U .)
Example 3.42 Consider the wff (∃xP (x) ∧ ∀yQ(y)) in the model M where
U = {2, 3}, P (x) and Q(y) are unary predicates, and their unary relations are
PU = {2} and QU = {3}. To find the truth value of this wff, it is necessary
to find its parsing sequence and evaluate the truth value at each step.
1: P (2) = T and P (3) = F by PU of the hypothesis and Pn of the
truth value rules.
2: Q(3) = T and Q(2) = F by QU and Pn
3: ∃xP (x) = T by 1 and ∃.
4: ∀yQ(y) = F by 2 and ∀.
5: (∃xP (x) ∧ ∀yQ(y)) = F by 3, 4, and ∧.
Thus the wff is false in this model.
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Example 3.43 Consider the wff ∃x∀yR(x, y) in the model M where
U = {2, 3}, R(x, y) is a binary predicate, and its binary relation is
RU2 = {(2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2)}.
1: R(2, 2), R(2, 3), R(3, 2) are T. R(3, 3) is F.
2: ∀yR(x, y): R(x, 2) = T and R(x, 3) = T iff x = 2.
3: ∃x∀yR(x, y) = T by 1 and 2.
Hence the wff is true in this model.
When a wff α is true in a model M , M is said to satisfy, or model, the
wff and is denoted by M |= α or αM = T. If α is false in a model, then M 6|= α
or αM = F. Similary, M can model a set of wffs H, denoted M |= H when M
models every wff in H. The rules for a wff satisfying a model M in first order
logic can be extended from those of sentential logic given in proposition 2.48.
Proposition 3.44 If M is a model with a universe U , α is a wff, x is a
variable, and a is an element of U , then:
∃: If M |= ∃xα then M |= α(x//a) for some a.
¬∃: If M |= ¬∃xα then M |= ¬α(x//a) for every a.
∀: If M |= ∀xα then M |= α(x//a) for every a..
¬∀: If M |= ¬∀xα then M |= ¬α(x//a) for some a.
Proof: The reasoning for this proposition follows from the notion of
M modeling a wff α and the definition of the truth value αM of a wff α in
a model M . For example, M |= ∃xα means α(x//a)M = T for at least one
a ∈ U , so M |= α(x//a). Likewise, if M |= ¬∃xα then ¬α(x//a)M = T for
every a ∈ U so M |= ¬α(x//a). The reasoning for the rest is similar, and so
is left to the reader.
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The tautology of sentential logic has an analogy in first order logic: the
valid wff.
Definition 3.45 A wff α is valid if it holds (is true) in every model of its
universe U .
A few very small examples help illustrate this concept.
Example 3.46 Let U = {0, 1} and there be only one unary predicate
P (x) = P . There are four possible models, given by the different unary
relations PU = ∅, PU = {0}, PU = {1}, and PU = {0, 1}. Coinsider the wff
∀xP (x) ⇒ ∃xP (x). It is easy to see in the first three models the antecedent
will be false and thus the entire wff will be true. For the last, P (x) is true for
every element, so both ∀xP (x) and ∃xP (x) are true, and thus the entire wff
is true. Hence ∀xP (x)⇒ ∃xP (x) is valid in the universe U .
Example 3.47 Let U = {0, 1} as before, but let there be one binary predicate
P (x, y) = P2. Then there are sixteen possible models:
1: PU2 = ∅ 9: PU2 = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}
2: PU2 = {(0, 0)} 10: PU2 = {(0, 1), (1, 1)}
3: PU2 = {(0, 1)} 11: PU2 = {(1, 0), (1, 1)}
4: PU2 = {(1, 0)} 12: PU2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0)}
5: PU2 = {(1, 1)} 13: PU2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}
6: PU2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1)} 14: PU2 = {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
7: PU2 = {(0, 0), (1, 0)} 15: PU2 = {(0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
8: PU2 = {(0, 0), (1, 1)} 16: PU2 = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}
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Consider the wff ∃x∀yP (x, y) ⇒ ∀y∃xP (x, y). For the antecedent to
be false, PUx must lack at least one element (x, y) where y = 1 or y = 2. Thus,
the antecedent is false in models 1-5, 7, and 10, so the wff is true in these
models. For the consequent to be true, there must be at least two elements of
U2 for which P (x, y) is true, one in which y = 0 and one in which y = 1. Thus
the consequent is true for models 6, 8, 9, and 11-16 and so is the wff. Hence
the wff holds in every model and thus is valid.
Unfortunately, most wffs of first order logic cannot be proven valid via
case analysis as the previous two were. The wff ∀xP (x)⇒ ∃xP (x) of example
3.46 is actually valid for any non-empty set U , but that is much more difficult
proof. As the number of predicates increases, the number of models grows even
faster. For example, if M is a model in first order logic with a universe U that
contains n elements and only one unary predicate PU , there are 2n number
of models (In example 3.46, n = 2 and there were 22 models). Two unary
predicates increases this to (2n)2 possible models. A single binary predicate
gives (2n
2
) models (in example 3.47, n = 2 and there were (22
2
= 16 models).
An infinite number of predicates, which is often the case, gives an infinite
number of possible models to consider. To prove the validity of a first order
logic wff for all models and for universes of infinite size, it is necessary to use
a proof which apply in such settings: the semantic tableau.
3.7 Examples
With first order logic it is now possible to explore the postulates of the
axiomatic systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, group theory, and Peano
Arithmetic. The axioms of each system define the elements of the universe U
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in which we will consider various model. There is also a language L that will be
taken into consideration for each system. Certain symbols and their associated
meanings, such as connectives, quantifiers, variables, and parenthesis will be
implied rather than explicitely listed in L. Similarly, the equality symbol ‘=’
will be a member of any language where equality is axiomatically defined as
follows:
Axioms of Equality (EA):
EA1: ∀x(x = x) Equality is reflexive
EA2: ∀x∀y(x = y ⇒ y = x) Equality is symmetric
EA3: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) Equality is transitive
EA4: ∀a∀b, (a ∈ H∧a = b⇒ b ∈ H) Sets are closed under equality
These four postulates are known as the Equality Axioms and explicitely
define the symbol =. A model M adheres to these axioms if for every a and b
in a universe U , M |= a = b if and only if a is quantitatively the same as b, that
is, if for a predicate P (x), (P (a) ⇔ P (b)) ⇒ a = b. The axioms ensure the
reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, and closure of equality. Thus when a proof
cites EA4, it uses the specific axiom implied by the existence of the equality
symbol in the system under consideration. For example, in ZF, two sets are
equal if they contain the same elements, which is the first of eight axioms of
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory.
Axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF):
ZF1: ∀z(z ∈ X ⇔ z ∈ Y )⇒ X = Y Axiom of Extensionality
ZF2: ∀x∀y∃Z(x ∈ Z ∧ y ∈ Z) Axiom of Pairing
ZF3: ∀X∀α∃Y ∀y(y ∈ Y ⇔ (y ∈ X ∧ α(y))) Axiom of Subsets
ZF4: ∀X∃Y ∀x(x ∈ Y ⇔ ∃z(z ∈ X ∧ x ∈ z)) Axiom of Union
ZF5: ∀X∃Y ∀x(x ∈ Y ⇔ x ⊆ X) Axiom of the Power Set
ZF6: ∃X(∅ ∈ X ∧ ∀x((x ∈ X) ∧ (x ∪ {x} ∈ X))) Axiom of Infinity
ZF7: ∀x∀y∀z(β(x, y) ∧ β(x, z)⇒ y = z ⇒
∀X∃Y ∀y(y ∈ Y ⇔ (∃x ∈ X)β(x, y))) Axiom of Replacement
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ZF8: ∀X(x 6= ∅ ⇒ ∃x((x ∈ X)∧(X∩x = ∅))) Axiom of Foundation
(where ∅ = {y : y 6= y})
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is a universe which consists of various sets
(including ∅) which comply with the above axioms. The language of ZF in-
cludes symbols of set thoery such as ∈, ∪, ∩, ⊆, etc (as well as the previously
mentioned sets).
The first postulate, the Axiom of Extensionality, simply states that if
two sets have the same elements they are equal. The Axiom of Pairing is also
known as the Axiom of the Unordered Pair and establishes that for any two
elements (potentially sets) there exists a set which contains only those two
elements. The Axiom of Union is also refrerred to as the Axiom of the Sum
Set and gives that for any set there is another set which is the union of all
elements of the first set. The Axiom of the Power Set simply says that for any
set X there is a set Y=P(X) which is the set of all subsets of X, referred to
as the power set. The Axiom of Infinity ensures the existence of an infinite
set. The Axiom of Foundation is also known as the Axiom of Regularity and
states that every non-empty set contains a subset which is disjoint, that is,
they have no elements in common.
Before discussing the Axiom of Subsets and the Axiom of Replacement
it is important to note both incorporate, respectively, a unary predicate α and
a binary predicate β. Recall that an n-ary relation such as αZF1 or β
ZF
2 is a
set, thus when predicates α(x) or β(x, y) are true it is equivalent to stating
x ∈ αU1 or (x, y) ∈ βU2 .
Other names for the Axiom of Subsets include (but is not limited to) the
Axiom of Separation, Axiom of Comprehension, and Axiom of Specification.
The Axiom of Subsets states that given a property described by a predicate
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α, then, for any set X there is a set Y that contains every element x of X
which has that property, that is, for which α(x) is true. Note that this means
a set S cannot be defined as S = {s : s 6∈ s} as each individual s must belong
to a specified “Y.” Thus there is a restriction to X that prevents Russel’s
Paradox (recall example 2.5). The Axiom of Replacement states that if F is a
function then for any set X there is a set Y = F(X) = {F (x) : x ∈ X}. This
is clearer if you consider β(x, y) to be associated with a mapping x→ y, that
is, βZF2 = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn), · · · : xi 6= xj for all i, j} . Thus the
antecedent of the axiom implies every element is mapped to exactly one other
element and the consequent ensures the existence of a subset for which the
mapping is surjective.
Recall that a model in a non-empty set U is a system where every pred-
icate has an n-ary relation assigned to it. By ZF6, it is known ZF contains at
least one set X, so it is non-empty. An n-ary relation is a set, thus an assign-
ment to a predicate is merely a set associated with a symbol. For example, ZF
gives the symbol ∅ the assignment {y : y 6= y}. Thus a model in ZF is simply
some system which defines at least one set without contradicting the axioms
of ZF. Such definitions are given axiomatically in examples 3.48 through 3.50.
Example 3.48 The Grothendieck Universe [9] is a model in the universe of
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory which gives a set U with the following properties:
1. ∀x∀y(x ∈ U ∧ y ∈ x⇒ y ∈ U) U is a transitive set
2. ∀x∀y(x ∈ U ∧ y ∈ U⇒ {x, y} ∈ U) U contains all pairs
3. ∀x(x ∈ U⇒ P (x) ∈ U) U contains all power sets
4. ∀X∀ux(X ∈ U ∧ {ux : x ∈ X} ⇒ ∪
x∈X
ux ∈ U)
where {ux : x ∈ X} is a collection of elements of U
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Example 3.49 In the universe of Zermelo-Fraenkel Set theory, the von Neu-
mann Universe [15] is a model which gives a hierarchy of sets, denoted V ,
defined as follows:
• V0 is the empty set ∅ = {}
• For an ordinal number β (well-ordered set β), Vβ+1 = P (Vβ)
• For any limit ordinal α, Vα = ∪
β<α
Vβ
• V = ∪
α
Vα
It is interesting to note that for natural rather than ordinal numbers,
VN is the set of hereditarily finite sets (hereditarily finite sets are defined
recursively where, given that ∅ is a hereditarily finite set, if s1, s2, · · · , sn are
hereditarily finite sets then {s1, s2, · · · , sn} is also hereditarily finite). However
VN is a model of ZF only when the Axiom of Infinitiy is negated.
Example 3.50 The Constructible Universe L [2] is a model of ZF created by
Kurt Go¨del. It is constructed similarly to the von Nuemann Universe except
Vβ+1 is more strictly defined. L is defined recursively as follows:
• L0 is the empty set ∅ = {}
• For an ordinal number β and a wff γ of first order logic,
Lβ+1 = {y : y ∈ Lβ ∧ (γ(y, z1, z2, · · · , zn) ∧ z1, z2, · · · , zn ∈ Lβ}
• For any limit ordinal α, Vα = ∪
β<α
Vβ
• L = ∪
α
Lα
Verbally, the second line says Lβ+1 is constructed from the subsets of
the previous stage which can be defined by a wff whose parameters are from,
and quantifiers affect, only the previous stage. Go¨del proved both the Axiom
of Choice and the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis were true in this model.
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A group (G, ∗) is a set G with a binary operation ∗ which satisfies the
following four group axioms:
Group Axioms (GA):
GA1: ∀a∀b(a, b ∈ G⇒ a ∗ b ∈ G) Closure
GA2: ∀a∀b∀c(a, b, c ∈ G⇒ (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c)) Associativity
GA3: ∀a(a, e ∈ G⇒ e ∗ a = a = a ∗ e) Identity
GA4: ∀a∃b(a, b ∈ G⇒ a ∗ b = e = b ∗ a) Inverse
Group theory is a universe which contains elements a, b, c, etc, as well
as a constant e, all of which comply with the above axioms. The language
of GA includes a binary operation ∗ as well as these previously mentioned
elements.
Closure ensures that any two elements from G which are combined by
the binary operation produces an element which is also in G. Associativity
ensures the order in which the binary operation performs is irrelevant as long
as the sequence of elements it acts on remains unchanged. Identity ensures the
existence of an element which does not affect any other element in the binary
operation. Inverse establishes that every element has a counterpart such that
their combination under the binary operation produces the identity.
A model in group theory is a specific set which can be acted upon under
a specified binary operation, i.e. a group is a model of group theory.
Example 3.51 The integers, Z, under addition, +, form a group (G, +). This
is evident as for all integers a, b, and c
• a+ b ∈ Z
• (a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c)
• 0 + a = a+ 0 = a
• a+ (−a) = (−a) + a = 0
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Indeed the rationals, real, and complex numbers also form a group
under addition. However, the naturals do not as they lack inverses. Similarly,
the integers under multiplication (G, ·) do not form a model of group theory
as not every element has a multiplicative inverse. For example, if a = 5, it’s
inverse would be 1
5
which is not an integer.
Example 3.52 The integers without 0 modulo p for p a prime form a group
(Zp, ·) under multiplication. The reasoning follows from the fact a1 = a2 mod
p implies gcd(a1, p) = gcd(a2, p) = 1. Thus for a, b, and c in Zp:
• (a mod p) · (b mod p) = (a · b) mod p ∈ Zp
• (((a · b) mod p) · c) mod p = (a · ((b · c) mod p) mod p
• a · 1 = 1 · a = a (as ∀p, 1 ∈ Zp)
• For every a there exists an x such that a · x = 1 mod p. Such an x can
be found by solving ax− np = 1 where gcd(x, n) = 1 and n is
some natural number.
The reasoning for this last line becomes more evident when a specific
model such as Z5 = {1, 2, 3, 4) is considered. The inverse for 1 is, of course 1.
For 2 it is necessary to solve the equation 2x − n5 = 1. If n = 1, 2x − 5 = 1
implies x = 3. 3 ∈ Z5 thus we have the inverse for 2 (The inverse of 3 will
then be 2). For 4, the equation becomes 4x − n5 = 1. However, x 6∈ Z5 for
n = 1, 2, or 3. Only when n = 4 does x = 4 ∈ Z5. Thus the inverse of 4 is 4.
Example 3.53 . The Diehdral group Dn is a model of group theory which
gives the symmetries (rotation and reflection) of a regular polygon. For exam-
ple, D4 is the 8 element Diehdral group of a square, containg four rotations
R0, R1, R2, and R3 and four reflections S4, S6, S6, and S7, illustrated below:
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S0
Rotation by 0◦
D C
BA
S1
Rotation by 90◦
C B
AD
S2
Rotation by 180◦
B A
DC
S3
Rotation by 270◦
A D
CB
R4
C D
AB
R5
A B
CD
R6
B C
DA
@
@
@
R7
D A
BC
 
 
 
The binary operation for the model is composition. For example,
S1 ◦ S1 = S2, R4 ◦R7 = S3, and S1 ◦R6 = R4.
Peano’s axioms form a universe which includes a constant 0 and an
infinite number of elements s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), etc, where s(x) is the
successor function defined by the first order wff ∀x(x ∈ S ⇒ s(x) ∈ S). The
language of PA includes these elements as well as the symbols + and ·, all of
which satisfy the following axioms:
Axioms of Peano Arithmetic (PA):
PA1: ∀x(¬s(x) = 0) There is no element in S whose successor is 0
PA2: ∀x∀y(s(x) = s(y)⇒ x = y) s is an injection
PA3: ∀y1∀y2 · · · ∀yn(α(0) ∧ ∀x(α(x)⇒ α(s(x)))⇒ ∀xα(x))
where α(x) is a wff of the Peano Axioms whose free variables
are among x, y1, y2, · · · , yn. First Order Induction Axiom
PA4: ∀x(x+ 0 = x) Recursive definitions of +
PA5: ∀x∀y(x+ s(y) = s(x+ y))
PA6: ∀x(x · 0 = 0) Recursive definitions of ·
PA7: ∀x∀y(x · s(y) = (x · y) + x)
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The first two postulates, in combination with the constant 0 and the
definition of the successor function s(x), are known as the Peano Axioms, and
explicitely define the universe PA. This is done by first assuming that the
set PA is non-empty and drawing the conclusion that it must contain some
constant element which can be denoted by the symbol 0. Next, a successor
function s is defined such that each element x of PA is associated with a single
element of PA given by the successor function, denoted s(x). It is important to
note that the successor function is closed in PA as for every element x ∈ PA,
s(x) is also in PA. Axiom 1 simply states 0 is not the successor of any element.
Axiom 2 states that if two elements have the same successor, then they must
be the same.
Although these axioms show PA contains the infinite subset
{0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), · · · } for which no two elements are equal, it does
not prove every element of PA is in the set. This is given by PA3, known as
the First Order Induction Axiom. This is a weaker version of Peano’s original
Induction Axiom which states the folllowing:
PA5: If U is a set such that:
• 0 ∈ U
• ∀x(x ∈ U ⇒ s(x) ∈ U)
Then U contains every element of S.
However, as U is undefined, in first order logic it is impossible to apply
quantifiers. Thus the First Order Induction Axiom defines the set via a pred-
icate α. Recall that α(x) is true if x is an element of some set αPA defined by
the unary relation on α. Thus α(0) says 0 ∈ αPA and α(x)⇒ α(s(x))) mean
x ∈ αPA ⇒ s(x) ∈ αPA. Thus the First Order Induction Axiom can replace
the original to provide a set of axioms expressed in first order logic.
Axioms 4-7 give a recursive definition of + and ·. Both symbols corre-
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spond to a mapping PA×PA→ PA. A model in PA consists of the elements
of PA (although they may be represented differently, i.e. s(0) = 1 ), a
constant 0 ∈ PA and a successor function s (all of which must satisfy the
axioms). There are both standard and non-standard models for Peano Arith-
metic.
Example 3.54 The standard model of Peano Arithmetic is the natural num-
bers N={0, 1, 2, 3, · · · } where addition and subtraction are as defined by basic
arithmetic and the successor function is defined such that s(x) = x + 1, that
is s(0) = 1, s(s(o)) = 2, s(s(s(0))) = 3, etc. This means wffs such as 1 + 1 = 2
can be proven using the Peano Axioms (as will be shown in section 4.5).
Now the orginal second-order logic Peano Axioms established that, up
to isomorphism, the natural numbers where the only model of PA. However,
first order logic allows for other models of PA to exists. Any such model
contains at least a set which, when linearly ordered (i.e. 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc)
is isomorphic to N. A model which contains additional elements is called non-
standard. The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem and the compactness theorem of
model theory both guarantee the existence of non-standard models.
Now that the axiomatic systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set thoery, group
theory, and Peano Arithmetic have been outlined and explained, along with
various models, the next step is to provide a proof for the theorems (valid wffs)
of each system. The semantic tableau gives such a proof.
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Chapter 4
The Semantic Tableau
This chapter will use the commonalities of sentential and first order
logic to give definitions, examples, and proofs which will apply to both logics
simultaneously. These shared concepts will be used to explore the notion that a
wff can be a semantic consequence of a set of wffs, i.e. true in the same models.
The idea of contradictory and finished sets will also be introduced, along with
a theorem that states every finished set has a model. The information of these
first three sections will lay the groundwork for the construction of semantic
tableaus in the final section. This last section will also show how semantic
tableaus can prove a wff is a semantic consequence as well as a wff’s validity.
4.1 Reconciling Sentential and First Order Logic
Sentential and first order logic share several aspects in common, includ-
ing propositions, connectives, and truth values from the set {T, F}. This
section will show how these shared aspects can be used to express definitions,
examples, and even proofs simultaneously for both logics.
At the end of section 3.2 the 0-ary predicate P0 and its 0-ary relation
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PU0 was briefly discussed. The predicate P0 is the proposition of first order
logic; an expression with no variables that has a truth value in a model defined
by the relation PU0 . While a sentential logic model sends a proposition P to
the set {T, F}, a first order logic model in a universe U sends PU0 to the
set {{()}, ∅}. As any n-ary relation PUn = ∅ gives an evaluated predicate
Pn(a1, a2, · · · , an) a truth value of F for (a1, a2, · · · , an) ∈ Un, PU0 = ∅ means
P0() is false. On the other hand, the relation P
U
0 = {()} indicates P0() is
true as () ∈ {()}. Thus there is a mapping PU0 → {{()}, ∅} → {T,F} that
resembles the sentential mapping P → {T,F}.
This implies sentential logic can be described in a similar way as first
order logic, i.e. many definitions of first order logic can be used simlutaneously
for both logics. For example, a sentential wff is valid by definition 3.45 if it
is a tautology. Similarly, definition 3.39 of a model can be used universally,
where, in sentential logic, every ‘predicate’ has 0-arity, the only relation is the
0-ary relation given above, and U is inconsequential (as only U0 = {{()} is
considered). Though it is important to realize there are two ways “model” can
be used in association with a wff or set of wffs. A wff α can be considered in
a particular model M and may be either true or false in that model. M may
also model α, or be a model of α, both of which imply α is true in M and are
denoted by the turnstile symbol M |= α.
As a proposition P is a predicate P0, the recursive definitions 2.25
and 3.24 which create sentential and first order logic wffs imply every wff
of sentential logic is also a wff of first order logic (although the reverse is
certainly not true). Thus wffs which are valid in sentential logic are also valid
in first order logic. For the remainder of this paper, if a definition, example,
or theorem uses wffs that are not specified as being of a particular logic, it
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is considered to apply in both logics (i.e., if an example uses two wffs α and
β, they can both be wffs of sentential logic or both wffs of first order logic).
This allows many proofs to be condensed, as much of what composes a proof
in sentential logic is needed (but not suffices) to prove its counterpart in first
order logic.
This compression of proofs will be convenient as ideas such as semantic
consequence, finished sets, and tree diagrams must be explored before semantic
tableaus can even be considered.
4.2 Semantic Consequence
Definition 4.1 A wff α is a semantic consequence of a set of wffs H,
denoted H |= α, if every model of H is a model of α.
Deductive reasoning is based on the idea a conclusion is a semantic
consequence of some premises. Modus ponens uses that a wff β is a semantic
consequence of wffs α and (α ⇒ β.) This follows, because if α and (α ⇒ β)
are true in a model M , by propositions 2.48 and 3.44, so is β. Similarly, in
modus tollens, the wff ¬α is a semantic consequence of wffs ¬β and (α⇒ β).
Example 4.2 Let β1 and β2 be true wffs in a model M . Then α = (β1 ⇔ β2)
is also a true wff in M and thus is a semantic consequence of β1 and β2 by
propositions 2.48 and 3.44.
Example 4.3 Consider the sentential logic wffs (p ∨ q) and (r ⇒ s). By the
truth table given in example 2.49, it is evident the wff ((p ∨ q) ∧ (r ⇒ s)) is
a semantic consequence of those wffs, as every model in which they are true,
((p ∨ q) ∧ (r ⇒ s)) is also true.
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Example 4.4 Consider the sentential logic wff α : ((p ∧ q) ∧ r), where p, q,
and r are propositions and the set H = {β1, β2, β3, β4} where
β1 : (p⇒ q)
β2 : (q ⇒ r)
β3 : (p⇔ r)
β4 : (p ∨ q)
Does H |= α? It is necessary to conside all possible models for p, q,
and r, as illustrated in the table, to show any model Mi in which every wff
of H is satisfied, α is as well. As β1 is assumed to be true, this wff implies
pMi = T and qMi = F is impossible for the same model i. Thus M2 and M6
are eliminated. Similary, β2 disqualifies M5 and M6. β3 indicates pMi = rMi
so M3, M4, M5 and M6 are eliminated. β4 indicates both qMi and rMi cannot
be false, eliminating M6 and M8.
p q r Disqualification
M1 T T T
M2 T F T β1
M3 F T T β3
M4 F F T β3, β4
M5 T T F β3, β2
M6 T F F β1, β3, β4
M7 F T F β2
M8 F F F β4
Thus M1 is the only model in which every wff of H is true (Note that
every wff βi was required to eliminate the other models). Thus pM1 = qM1 =
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rM1 = T and the wff α : ((p∧ q)∧ r) is true when β1, β2, β3, and β4 are. Thus
α is a semantic consequence of the wffs β1, β2, β3, and β4 and H |= α.
The turnstile notation |= can be used in three ways, so it is important
to realize what the notation is symbolizing. If M is a model, H a set of wffs,
and α a single wff, then:
• M |= α indicates M is a model of α, i.e. α is true in M .
• M |= H indicates M is a model of every wff in H.
• H |= α indicates every model of H is a model of α.
Validity can be stated using semantic consequence. Now a wff α is valid
if it is true in every model, while α is a semantic consequence of set off wffs H
if it is true in the same models as H. The empty set ∅ is true in every model,
thus if ∅ |= α, α is valid.
Suppose a set of wffs H contains both a wff α and its negation ¬α. Now,
no wff can be a semantic consequence of such as a set, because no model M
models both a wff and its negation. This type of set is considered contradictory
and is addressed in the next section.
4.3 Finished Sets
This section focuses on the notion of contradictory and finished sets,
both of which are necessary in the construction of semantic tableaus. This
section will also present a proof that every finished set of wffs has a model.
Definition 4.5 A set W of wffs is contradictory if there exists some wff α
such that both α and ¬α are in W .
Example 4.6 The set of wffs {¬α, α, β, γ} is contradictory while the sets of
wffs {α, β, γ} and {¬αβ, γ} are not.
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Definition 4.7 A basic wff is a simple wff or the negation of a simple wff.
A basic wff of sentential logic is then either a proposition or the negation
of a proposition. Similarly, a basic wff of first order logic is a n-ary predicate
(n potentially 0) or the negation of an n-ary predicate.
Definition 4.8 A set W of wffs is finished if it is not contradictory and for
each wff γ in W , either γ is basic or one of the following is true:
¬¬: γ has the form ¬¬α, where α ∈ W .
∧: γ has the form (α ∧ β), where α ∈ W and β ∈ W .
¬∧: γ has the form ¬(α ∧ β) where either ¬α ∈ W or ¬β ∈ W .
∨: γ has the form (α ∨ β), where either α ∈ W or β ∈ W .
¬∨: γhas the form ¬(α ∨ β), where both ¬α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W .
⇒: γ has the form (α⇒ β), where either ¬α ∈ W or β ∈ W .
¬ ⇒: γ has the form ¬(α⇒ β), where both α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W .
⇔: γ has the form (α ⇔ β), where either both α ∈ W and β ∈ W , or
both ¬α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W .
¬ ⇔: γ has the form ¬(α⇔ β), where either both α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W ,
or both ¬α ∈ W and β ∈ W .
If W is a set of wffs of first order logic in a universe U , every wff γ ∈ W
must have no parameters or free variables and, if γ is not basic, one of the
following may be true:
∀: γ has the form ∀xα where α(x//a) ∈ W for every a ∈ U .
¬∀: γ has the form ¬∀xα where ¬α(x//a) ∈ W for some a ∈ U .
∃: γ has the form ∃xα where α(x//a) ∈ W for some a ∈ U .
¬∃: γ has the form ¬∃xα where ¬α(x//a) ∈ W for every a ∈ U .
Example 4.9 Consider the set of wffs {α, β,¬γ,¬(α ⇒ γ), (α ∨ ¬(β ∧ γ))}.
By definition 4.8, this is a finished set as:
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• α, β, and ¬γ are all basic wffs.
• For ¬(α⇒ γ), both α and ¬γ are in the set.
• For (α ∨ ¬(β ∧ γ)), α is in the set.
Note that if any one of the basic wffs were missing, this would not be
a finished set.
Example 4.10 Consider the set of wffs {∀xα, α(1), α(2)} in the universe
U = {1, 2, 3}. By definition 4.8, this is not a finished set as α(3) is missing.
Example 4.11 Consider the set of wffs {(α ∨ β), (α ∧ β), α,¬α, β, } . By
definition 4.8, this is not a finished set as it contains both a wff and its negation.
Theorem 4.12 The Finished Set Thoerem: If W is a finished set of wffs
then W has a model.
Proof: If W is a finished set of wffs (with a universe U in first order
logic) then the set containing the basic wffs of W has at least one model M
where γM = T if γ ∈ W and γM = F if γ 6∈ W , where γ is a basic wff (γM=T
means γ(a1, a2, · · · , an) ∈ γUn for an n-ary relation specified by M in first order
logic, where each ai ∈ U). This implies γM=F if ¬γ ∈ W . Through induction,
it can be proven M is a model of the entire set W .
If γ is a basic wff of W , then M models γ by the definition of M given
above. Now assume M models every wff in W with length less than γ. Then,
as γ ∈ W , and W is a finished set, γ must be in one of the thirteen forms
of definition 4.8 (the first nine for a sentential finished set) and the following
must be true by propositions 2.48 and 3.44:
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γ = ¬¬α: Then α ∈ W and, as M |= α, M |= ¬¬α.
γ = (α ∧ β): Then α ∈ W and β ∈ W , and, as M |= α and M |= β,
M |= (α ∧ β)
γ = ¬(α ∧ β): Then either ¬α ∈ W or ¬β ∈ W , and, as M |= ¬α or
M |= ¬β, M |= ¬(α ∧ β).
γ = (α ∨ β): Then eitherr α ∈ W or β ∈ W , and, as M |= α or M |= β,
M |= (α ∨ β).
γ = ¬(α ∨ β): Then both ¬α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W and, as M |= ¬α and
M |= ¬β, M |= ¬(α ∨ β).
γ = (α ⇒ β): Then either ¬α ∈ W or β ∈ W and, as M |= ¬α or
M |= β, M |= (α⇒ β).
γ = ¬(α ⇒ β): Then both α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W , and, as M |= α and
M |= ¬β, M |= ¬(α⇒ β).
γ = (α ⇔ β): Then either both α ∈ W and β ∈ W , or both ¬α ∈ W
and ¬β ∈ W , and, as M |= α and M |= β or M |= ¬α and
M |= ¬β, M |= (α⇔ β).
γ = ¬(α⇔ β): Then either both α ∈ W and ¬β ∈ W , or both ¬α ∈ W
and β ∈ W and, as M |= α and M |= ¬β or M |= ¬α and M |= β,
M |= ¬(α⇔ β).
γ = ∀xα: Then α(x//a) ∈ W for every a ∈ U and, as M |= α(x//a) for
every a, M |= ∀xα
γ = ¬∀xα: Then ¬α(x//a) ∈ W for some a ∈ U and, as M |= ¬α(x//a)
for some a, M |= ¬∀xα.
γ = ∃xα: Then α(x//a) ∈ W for some a ∈ U , and, as M |= α(x//a) for
some a, M |= ∃xα.
γ = ¬∃xα: Then ¬α(x//a) ∈ W for every a ∈ U and, as M |= ¬α(x//a)
for every a, M |= ¬∃xα.
Thus, by induction, M models every wff in W , so M models W (Note
that the model of this proof is constructed based on the basic wffs of W , so
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the proof also shows that any model of those basic wffs in W is a model of all
the wffs in W ).
Now that the notions of contradictory and finished sets have been de-
fined, it is possible to use them to develop semantic tableaus.
4.4 Semantic Tableaus
Semantic Tableaus, also known as truth trees, are decision making and
proof procedures for sentential and first order logic. They are often easier
to evaluate than a truth table and are not limited to sentential logic as the
tables are. Tableaus can build a model of a set of wffs, show how one wff is
a semantic consequence of others, and prove a wff is valid (although all but
the last will be explored in the next chapter). The term “semantic” is used
as it is indicative of the fact wffs can take different truth values in different
models “Semantic tableau” is often shortened to simply “tableau,” where the
term is implied rather than stated. This section will develop the notion of tree
diagrams and then use them to segue into tableaus.
A wff can be proven valid by either showing it is true in every model or
by showing that there is no model in which it is false; in other words, presenting
a confutation of the negation of the wff. This is done by assuming the wff is
not true and deriving a contradiction. The argument of modus ponens, where
((α⇒ β) ∧ α)⇒ β, can be proven by this method in the following way:
1: First, assume the negation, ¬(((α ⇒ β) ∧ α) ⇒ β) is true in some
model. This implies ((α ⇒ β) ∧ α) ⇒ β) is false. But this can only
happen if the antecedent is true and the consequent is false, i.e.
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2: ((α⇒ β) ∧ α) is true and
3: ¬β is true (as β is false). However, if 2 is true, then the wffs joined
by the conjunction must both be true, i.e.
4: α⇒ β is true and
5: α is true. However 4 implies either the antecedent is false or the
consequent is true, or both. Thus
6: ¬α is true if the antecedent is false, which contradicts 5 and/or
7: β is true if the consequent is true, which contradicts 3.
Thus there is no model in which modus ponens is not true so it must be
true for all models. This reasoning process can be arranged into the following
diagram:
1: ¬(((p⇒ q) ∧ p)⇒ q) Negation of hypothesis
2: ((p⇒ q) ∧ p) by 1
3: ¬q by 1
4: p⇒ q by 2
5: p by 2
   @@
6: ¬p by 4 7: q by 4
This type of digram is referred to as a tree and can also be used to
prove a wff is a semantic consequence of other wffs. Each step of the reasoning
process corresponds to a node of the tree, the first of which is called the root,
though it is traditionally drawn at the top. The parent of a node t is the node
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given by the parent function pi(t). The single and double lines connecting these
nodes will be explained later in the section.
Definition 4.13 A tree T is a system with a finite or countable number of
nodes, a root node rT , and a parent function piT , where piT satisfies
pi0(t) = t, pi1(t) = pi(t), pi2(t) = pi(pi(t)), pi3(t) = pi(pi(pi(t))), · · · , pin(t) = rT .
This last part simply says that eventually the parent function, when
applied to a node t, and then to t’s parent, and then to t’s parent’s parents,
etc, will eventually reach the root node. It is helpful to distinguish between the
various types of nodes and the qualities they possess. A root and parent node
have already been described, but there are also ancestor, child, and bachelor
nodes.
The ancestors of a node t are the nodes pi0(t), pi1(t), pi2(t), etc, while
the proper ancestors of t are the nodes pi1(t), pi2(t), pi3(t), etc.Thus the
root is an ancestor of every node, including itself, and a proper ancesotor for
every node but itself. A child node t is a node with a parent pi(t) while a
grandchild node t has a grandparent pi(pi(t)). A bachelor node, or terminal
node, is a node with no children. Often nodes appear in patterns that resemble
branches on a tree, and can be grouped by this characteristic. Γ is a branch
of a tree T if Γ is a subset of T which includes the root node and the parent
of each nonroot node already in Γ, and each node in Γ is either a bachelor or
has exactly one child in Γ. Thus a branch of a tree will either have a single
bachelor node, and be finite, or no bachelor nodes at all, in which case it will
be infinite.
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Example 4.14 Consider how the previous definitions apply in the following
tree.
A
B
  @
C D
  @
E F
G
A is the root of the tree, whose parent function is defined by
pi(G) = E, pi(E) = pi(F) = D, pi(C) = pi(D) = B, and pi(B) = A. This means a
node such as C has the ancestors C, B, and A and the proper ancestors of the
node G are E, D, B, and A. The node D is the child of B and the grandchild
of A, while C, F, and G are all bachelor nodes. The branches of this tree are
(A, B, C), (A, B, D, E, G), and (A, B, D, F).
Definition 4.15 A labeled tree is a system with a tree T, a finite or count-
able set of wffs H called the hypotheses, and a wff φ(t) corresponding to each
nonroot node t.
When α = φ(t), the wff α is said to occur at t, or is t. The wffs of H
are considered to occur at the root node.
Definition 4.16 Γ is a finished branch of a labeled tree T if the set of wffs
corresponding to the nodes of the branch is either finished. Γ is a contradic-
tory branch if that set of wffs is contradictory.
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Example 4.17 Consider the tree diagram at the beginning of this chapter,
given again here.
1: ¬(((p⇒ q) ∧ p)⇒ q) Negation of hypothesis
2: ((p⇒ q) ∧ p) by 1
3: ¬q by 1
4: p⇒ q by 2
5: p by 2
   @@
6: ¬p by 4 7: q by 4
This is a labeled tree whose root was the hypothesis set that contained
only the negation of modus ponens. Its two branches (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7) were contradictory. Its parent function was defined by pi(6) =
pi(7) = 5, pi(5) = 4, pi(4) = 3, pi(3) = 2, and pi(2) = 1. The ancestors of 6
included every wff but 7, while the ancestors of 7 included every wff but 6.
Both 6 and 7 were bachelor nodes while every other node was a parent (Note
that the numbers actually represent their corresponding wffs on the labeled
tree).
A labeled tree can be of sentential logic or first order logic, depending
on the type of wffs used. Similarly, a tableau chain or tableau can be solely of
sentential logic, or expand to cover first order logic.
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Definition 4.18 A sentential logic tableau chain is a finite or infinite
sequence of finite labeled trees T0, T1, T2, · · · , Tn, · · · where
• T0 is a single root node with the hypotheses set H,
• each Tk+1 is found by applying a tableau extension rule at a bachelor
node t of Γk of Tk, where Γk is not contradictory,
• Tn is the last labeled tree of a finite tableau chain only if every branch
of Tn is finished or contradictory, and,
• for α and β wffs of sentential logic, the following are the tableau extension
rules:
¬¬: If t has an ancestor ¬¬α, add a child α of t.
∧: If t has an ancestor α ∧ β, add a child α and a grandchild β of t.
¬∧: If t has an ancestor ¬(α ∧ β), add two children ¬α and ¬β of t.
∨: If t has an ancestor α ∨ β, add two children α and β of t.
¬∨: If t has an ancestor ¬(α ∨ β), add a child ¬α and a grandchild
¬β of t.
⇒: If t has an ancestor α⇒ β, add two children ¬α and β of t.
¬ ⇒: If t has an ancestor ¬(α⇒ β), add a child α and a grandchild
¬β of t.
⇔: If t has an ancestor α⇔ β, add two children α and ¬α of t, a child
β of α, and a child ¬β of ¬α.
¬ ⇔: If t has an ancestor ¬(α⇔ β), add two children α and ¬α of t, a
child ¬β of α, and a child β of ¬α.
Definition 4.19 For a first order logic tableau chain it is neccessary to
add the following to the above definition, where
• α and β are now wffs of first order logic,
• x is a variable,
• a and b are either variables or parameters,
• b does not occur in any ancestor of the bachelor node t, and
• it is necessary to add the following tableau extension rules:
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∀: If t has an ancestor ∀xα, add a child α(x//a) of t.
¬∀: If t has an ancestor ¬∀xα, add a child ¬α(x//b).
∃: If t has an ancestor ∃xα, add a child α(x//b).
¬∃: If t has an ancestor ¬∃xα, add a child ¬α(x//a).
(Note that there may be infinitely many choices for a and b).
Pictorially, the tableau extension rules can be shown as follows, where
if A Wff is an ancestor, then a terminal node t can be extended to have a
child, marked by a single line, or a grandchild, marked by a double line.
89
Tableau Extension Rules
¬¬
...
¬¬α
...
t
α
∧
...
α ∧ β
...
t
α
β
¬∧
...
¬(α ∧ β)
...
t
  @
¬α ¬β
∨
...
α ∨ β
...
t
  @
α β
¬∨
...
¬(α ∨ β)
...
t
¬α
¬β
⇒
...
α⇒ β
...
t
  @
¬α β
¬ ⇒
...
¬(α⇒ β)
...
t
α
¬β
⇔
...
α⇔ β
...
t
  @
α ¬α
β ¬β
¬ ⇔
...
¬(α⇔ β)
...
t
 @
α ¬α
¬β β
∀
...
∀xα
...
t
α(x//a)
¬∀
...
¬∀xα
...
t
¬α(x//b)
∃
...
∃xα
...
t
α(x//b)
¬∃
...
¬∃xα
...
t
¬α(x//a)
90
The single and double line notation helps identify which tableau exten-
sions are used. For example, consider Γa and Γb, two branches of a tableau
which have been exteded from some node t as shown below:
Γa
...
t
α
β
Γb
...
t
α
β
The single lines used in Γa indicate two tableau extensions ¬¬ were
used on some ancestors ¬¬α and ¬¬β, while the single and double line combo
of Γb indicate a single tableau extensions ∧ was used on an ancestor α ∧ β.
Definition 4.20 A wff α corresponding to an ancestor node is used if a
tableau extension rule has been applied to it in order to extend through a
bachelor node t. α is unused if it is not basic and there is a noncontradictory
branch through t on which α is not used.
Thus Tn is the last labeled tree of a finite tableau chain only there are
no unused wffs (However, note that a ‘used’ wff which has extended a bachelor
node may still be ‘unused’ in the tableau as a whole).
Example 4.21 Consider the tableau chain of the negation of DeMorgan’s law
second law, ¬(¬(α∧β)⇔ (¬α∨¬β)), where α and β are wffs. The first labeled
tree, T0, is the hypothesis set. In this case, it is simply the negation of the
law.
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T0
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
T1 is found by applying an tableau extension rule to the terminal node
of T0 which is of the form ¬ ⇔ . Thus it is necessary to add two children (2
and 4) and two grandchildren (3 and 5)
T1
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
The grayscale numbering next to each node indicates the node it was
extended from. There are three ancestor nodes that can be extended at each
of the two terminal nodes to form T2. Extending with an ancestor that has
already been extended is allowable, but rather pointless as it simply creates a
loop. For simpliciy’s sake, the ancestors which do not give a branch will be
used first, to avoid creating large branches. Thus T2 will be extended from the
ancestor 3 and terminal node 3 using ¬∨ by adding a child and a grandchild.
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T2
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
The extension can continue at every terminal node on the left branch
until T5 at which point every node will be used.
T5
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
8: α 4
9: β 5
  @
10: ¬α 2 11: ¬β 2
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Simlarly, the right branch can be extended in the same way until T8,
where every branch is contradictory.
T8
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
8: α 4
9: β 5
  @
10: ¬α 2 11: ¬β 2
12: α ∧ β 4
13: α 11
14: β 11
  @
15: ¬α 5 16: ¬β 5
This sequence of trees, T0 through T8 is a tableau chain which applies
in both sentential and first order logic.
Definition 4.22 A finite tableau is a labeled tree Tn which is the last of a
finite tableau chain T0, T1, · · · , Tn. An infinite tableau is a tree which is
the union of an infinite tableau chain T0, T1, · · · , Tn, · · · .
T8 of example 4.21 was a finite tableau. Note that every branch of a
finite tableau is either contradictory or finished. A tableau then refers to either
a finite or infinite tableau with a hypothesis set H for its root. Although a
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tableau may be finite, its hypothesis set H may be either finite or countably
infinite.
Definition 4.23 A tableau confutation of a hypothesis set H of wffs is a
finite tableau T with root H where every branch of T is contradictory. A
tableau proof of a wff α from a hypothesis set H is a tableau confutation of
H ∪ {¬α}.
T8 of example 4.21 gives a tableau confutation of the one element set
{¬(¬(α ∧ β) ⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))} as every branch contains both a wff and its
negation. When a tableau proof of a wff α from H exist, it is said α is
provable from H, denoted H ` α. Similarly, the notation ` α says there exists
a tableau proof of α (here H = ∅). Such a wff is valid (this is proven in the next
chapter by the soundness theorem). T8 of example 4.21 proved the validity of
DeMorgan’s law. Similarly, the following example proves the validity of the
equivalence between an implication and its contrapositive (proven earlier in
example 2.54 for sentential logic only).
95
Example 4.24 Tableau proof that an implication and its contrapositive is
equivalent, i.e. (α ⇒ β) ⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α) is valid (in both sentential and first
order logic).
1: ¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α))
 HH
2: α⇒ β 1
3: ¬(¬β ⇒ ¬α) 1
6: ¬β 3
7: ¬(¬α) 3
8: α 7
  @
9: ¬α 2 10: β 2
4: ¬(α⇒ β) 1
5: ¬β ⇒ ¬α 1
11: α 4
12: ¬β 4
  @
13: ¬(¬β) 5 14: ¬α 5
15: β 13
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Example 4.25 Let P (x) and Q(x) be predicates. Then
∃x(P (x) ∨ Q(x) ` (∃xP (x) ∨ ∃xQ(x)) in first order logic by the following
tableau proof.
1: ¬(∃xP (x) ∨ ∃xQ(x)) Negation of wff; to be proven
2: ∃x(P (x) ∨Q(x)) Hypothesis
3: ¬∃xP (x) 1
4: ¬∃xQ(x) 1
5: ¬P (a) 3
6: ¬Q(a) 4
7: P (a) ∨Q(a) 2
  @
8: P (a) 7 9: Q(a) 7
Example 4.26 Consider a wff (α =⇒ γ) and the hypothesis set {(α =⇒
β), (β =⇒ γ)}. A tableau proof of the wff from the hypothesis set proves
the law of syllogism holds in both sentential and first order logic.
Syllogism, from the greek syllogismos meaning conclusion, inference, or
even deduction, is a method of deductive inference introduced by Aristotle in
his Prior Analytics in the 4th century, B.C. The law of syllogism, also known
as hypothetical syllogism, combines two statments involving an implication
and a common parameter to draw a third where the antecedent of the first
implies the consequent of the second. When the first two statements are true,
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the third is as well. For example:
1: If Jenny doesn’t work, then she will have no money. (α =⇒ β)
2: If Jenny has no money, then she can’t pay the rent. (β =⇒ γ)
3: If Jenny doesn’t work, then she can’t pay the rent. (α =⇒ γ)
In sentential and first order logic, the law of syllogism can be expressed
as either of the logically equivalent wffs given below:
(((α =⇒ β) ∧ (β =⇒ γ))⇒ (α =⇒ γ))
((α⇒ β)⇒ ((β ⇒ γ)⇒ (α⇒ γ)))
The following tableau shows the conclusion given by the law of syllogism is
provable from its premises, where {(α =⇒ β), (β =⇒ γ)} ` (α =⇒ γ).
1: ¬(α =⇒ γ) Negation of wff; to be proven
2: (α =⇒ β) Hypothesis
3: (β =⇒ γ) Hypothesis
4: (α) 1
5: (¬γ) 1
 HH
6: (¬α) 2 7: (β) 2
  @   @
8: (¬β) 3 9: (γ) 3 10: (¬β) 3 11: (γ) 3
Every branch is contradictory, thus (α =⇒ γ) is provable from
{(α =⇒ β), (β =⇒ γ)}.
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The law of syllogism is also valid, shown by the following tableau proof.
1: ¬(((α =⇒ β) ∧ (β =⇒ γ))⇒ (α =⇒ γ)) Negation of wff; to be proven
2: ((α =⇒ β) ∧ (β =⇒ γ)) 1
3: ¬(α =⇒ γ) 1
4: (α =⇒ β) 2
5: (β =⇒ γ) 2
6: α 3
7: (¬γ) 3
 HH
8: ¬α 4 9: β 4
 HH
8: ¬β 5 9: γ 5
Thus ` (((α =⇒ β) ∧ (β =⇒ γ)) ⇒ (α =⇒ γ)). Note that it was
not necessary to extend from 8 by using the ancestor 5 (as was done at 9),
because the left branch was already contradictory.
Both proofs show that the wffs under consideration are true (and valid,
in the second case). But consider the law of syllogism as applied to the fol-
lowing three predicates and two implications:
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• D(x): x is a dog.
• P (x): x is a pet.
• F (x): x has fur.
• (D(x)⇒ P (x)): If x is a dog, then x is a pet.
• (P (x)⇒ F (x)): If x is a pet, then x has fur.
The law of syllogism gives the conclusion (D(x) ⇒ F (x)): If x is a
dog, then x has fur. However, there are dogs without fur. Though the argu-
ment is valid, a premise is false in our universe and thus the reasoning is not
sound. This concept of soundness and its relationship with the tableau proof
is explored more fully in the next chapter.
4.5 Examples
Recall that a thoerem in an axiomatic system is any true wff which can
be obtained from the axioms via an accepted form of proof. This means any
wff with a tableau proof whose hypothesis set is the axioms of the system is
a theorem. This section will give several examples of such thoerems and their
proofs in the axiomatic systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel set thoery, group theory,
and Peano Arithmetic. This section will also show several examples of wffs
which are valid in a particular model of a system via a tableau proof which
includes both the system and the model axioms in its hypothesis set.
However, for convenience sake, the full set of axioms for each system
are not always included in the hypothesis set; simply the ones needed for the
proof. Similarly, steps in the proof may be condensed. For example, Γa may
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be written rather than Γb as part of a tree T
Γa
1: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
2: x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z 1
Γb
1: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
2: ∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) 1
3: ∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) 2
4: x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z 3
Similarly, if a tableau proof includes ancestor nodes x = y and y = z,
Γc may written for an extension to node k rather than the entire Γd (as the
left two branches of Γd are contradictory).
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Γc
1: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
2: x = y 1
3: y = z 1
...
k: x = z by 1, 2, and 3
Γd
1: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
2: x = y 1
3: y = z 1
...
k: x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z 1
 HH
k+2: x = z kk+1: ¬(x = y ∧ y = z) k
 HH
k+3: ¬(x = y) k +1 k+4: ¬(y = z) k+1
Also, any wffs which have been shown valid in first order logic may be
used in tableau proofs of individual theorems for various systems. For example,
modus ponens has the following tableau proof:
1: ¬((α ∧ (α⇒ β))⇒ β) EA1
2: (α ∧ (α⇒ β)) 1
3: ¬β 1
4: α 2
5: α⇒ β 2
 HH
6: ¬α 2 7: β 2
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Thus, if a tableau contains ancestors α and α⇒ β, for an extension to
k, the following may be added to said tableau:
1: α ancestor
2: α⇒ β ancestor
...
k: (α ∧ (α⇒ β))⇒ β Modus Ponens
 HH
k+1: ¬(α ∧ (α⇒ β)) 3 k+2: β 3
 HH
k+3: ¬α 4 k+4: ¬(α⇒ β) 4
As the left two branches are contradictory, a tableau proof with such
ancestors is often simply given the extension β as follows:
1: α ancestor
2: α⇒ β ancestor
...
k: β by Modus Ponens
Thus, keeping such shorthand in mind, it is possible to prove various
theorems in ZF, GA, PA, and their associated models.
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Example 4.27 Prove the empty set ∅ exists in the universe ZF, i.e.
∃X∀y(y ∈ X ∧ ¬(y = y)) is a theorem.
1: ¬∃X∀y(y ∈ X ∧ ¬(y = y)) Negation of wff
2: ∀y(y = y) EA1
3: ¬∀y(y ∈ X ∧ ¬(y = y)) 1
4: x ∈ X ∧ ¬(x = x) 3
5: x ∈ X 4
6: ¬(x = x) 4
7: x = x 2
Note that at several nodes, a choice was made of which a or b was to
be used for a substitution of the form β(x//a) or β(x//b) (where b did not
occur at any ancestor of the bachelor node but a may have). Explicitly, these
substitutions are listed here:
• 1 was of the form ¬∃ and a = X was chosen to form 3.
• 3 was of the form ¬∀ and b = x was chosen to form 4.
• 2 was of the form ∀ and a = x was chosen to form 6.
Including the axioms for a model in the hypothesis set of a tableau
proof shows a wff is true in said model. However, note that such a proof does
not show validity for the wff in every model.
104
Example 4.28 Prove that in the Grothendieck Universe U of ZF, if x ∈ U
then {x} ∈ U. That is, x ∈ U⇒ {x} ∈ U is true in this model of ZF.
1: ¬(x ∈ U⇒ {x} ∈ U) Negation of wff
2: ∀x∀y(x ∈ U ∧ y ∈ U⇒ {x, y} ∈ U) Second axiom of U
3: x ∈ U 1
4: ¬({x} ∈ U) 1
5: x ∈ U ∧ x ∈ U⇒ {x, x} ∈ U) 2
 HH
6: ¬(x ∈ U ∧ x ∈ U) 5 7: {x, x} ∈ U 5
8: {x} ∈ U 7 (definition of set)
  @
9: ¬(x ∈ U) 6 10: ¬(x ∈ U) 6
Thus x ∈ U⇒ {x} ∈ U is true in this model of ZF
Example 4.29 Prove inverses are unique in Group Theory, i.e.
∀x∀y∀z(x, y, z ∈ G⇒ (x ∗ z = e = z ∗ x∧ y ∗ z = e = z ∗ y ⇒ x = y)) is valid.
105
1: ¬∀x∀y∀z(x, y, z ∈ G⇒ (x ∗ z = e = z ∗ x ∧ y ∗ z = e = z ∗ y ⇒ x = y)) Negation
2: ∀x∀y∀z(x, y, z ∈ G⇒ (x ∗ y) ∗ z = x ∗ (y ∗ z)) GA2
3: ∀x(x ∈ G⇒ e ∗ x = x = x ∗ e) GA3
4: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
5: ¬(a, b, c ∈ G⇒ (a ∗ c = e = c ∗ a ∧ b ∗ c = e = c ∗ b⇒ a = b)) 1
6: a, b, c ∈ G 1
7: ¬(a ∗ c = e = c ∗ a ∧ b ∗ c = e = c ∗ b⇒ a = b) 1
8: a ∗ c = e = c ∗ a ∧ b ∗ c = e = c ∗ b 7
9: ¬(a = b) 7
10: a ∗ c = e = c ∗ a 8
11: b ∗ c = e = c ∗ b 8
12: a = a ∗ e 3
13: a ∗ e = a ∗ (c ∗ b) 11
14: a ∗ (c ∗ b) = (a ∗ c) ∗ b 2
continued on next page
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15: (a ∗ c) ∗ b = e ∗ b 10
16: e ∗ b = b 3
17: a = b 4, 12-16
Example 4.30 Prove (Zp, ·) is commutative in GA, i.e.
∀x∀y(x, y ∈ Zp ⇒ x · y = y · x). This tableau proof is actually very short,
merely two lines, as the definition of multiplication requires that it respects
products.
1: ¬(∀x∀y(x, y ∈ Zp ⇒ x · y = y · x)) Negation of wff
2: ∀x∀y(x, y ∈ Zp ⇒ x · y = y · x) definition of ·
Example 4.31 Prove D4 is not commutative in GA, i.e
∃x∃y(x, y ∈ D4 ⇒ ¬(x ◦ y = y ◦ x)), where elements of D4 are assigned as in
example 3.53.
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1: ¬(∃x∃y(x, y ∈ D4 ⇒ ¬(x ◦ y = y ◦ x))) Negation of wff
2: ¬(S3 = S1) By assignment in example 3.53
3: ¬(∃y(R4, y ∈ D4 ⇒ ¬(R4 ◦ y = y ◦R4))) 1
4: ¬(R4, R7 ∈ D4 ⇒ ¬(R4 ◦R7 = R7 ◦R4)) 3
5: R4, R7 ∈ D4 4
6: ¬¬(R4 ◦R7 = R7 ◦R4) 4
7: (R4 ◦R7 = R7 ◦R4) 6
8: (R4 ◦R7 = S3) Definition of ◦
9: (R7 ◦R4 = S1) Definition of ◦
10: (S3 = S1) By 7-9
Recall that a theorem proven by the axioms of a system must be valid in
every model. Thus, when an wff (such as commutativity) is true in one model
but false in another, the wff cannot be a thoerem of the axiomatic system of
the models.
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Example 4.32 Prove s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0)) in Peano Arithmetic.
1: ¬(s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0))) Negation of wff
2: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
3: ∀x(x+ 0 = x) PA4
4: ∀x∀y(x+ s(y) = s(x+ y)) PA5
5: s(0) + 0 = s(0) by 3
6: s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0) + 0) by 4
7: s(s(0) + 0) = s(s(0)) by 3
8: s(0) + s(0) = s(s(0)) by 2, 6, and 7
In the standard model of PA, this tableau proof shows 1 + 1 = 2.
Example 4.33 Prove ∀x(0 + x = x)
This tableau proof will require PA3, where α(x) : (0 + x = x). If both
α(0) and ∀x(α(x) ⇒ α(s(x))) are shown to be true, then PA3, the Axiom of
Induction, says ∀xα(x) is also true. To prove ∀x(α(x) ⇒ α(s(x))), it suffices
to show for an abitrary element of N, the antecedent implies the consequent.
This is illustrated by the following tableau proof.
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1: ¬∀x(0 + x = x) Negation of wff
2: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
3: ∀y1∀y2 · · · ∀yn(α(x//0) ∧ ∀x(α(x)⇒ α(x//s(x)))⇒ ∀xα(x)) PA3
4: ∀x(x+ 0 = x) PA4
5: ∀x∀y(x+ s(y) = s(x+ y)) PA5
6: 0 + 0 = 0 ∧ ∀x(0 + x = x⇒ 0 + s(x) = s(x))⇒ ∀x(0 + x = x) 3
HH
7: ¬(0 + 0 = 0 ∧ ∀x(0 + x = x⇒ 0 + s(x) = s(x))) 6 8: ∀x(0 + x = x) 6
HH
9: ¬(0 + 0 = 0) 7 10: ¬∀x(0 + x = x⇒ 0 + s(x) = s(x)) 7
11: 0 + 0 = 0 4 12: ¬(0 + b = b⇒ 0 + s(b) = s(b)) 10
13: 0 + b = b 12
14: ¬(0 + s(b) = s(b)) 12
15: 0 + s(b) = s(0 + b) by 5
16: s(0 + b) = s(b) by 13
17: 0 + s(b) = s(b) by 2, 15, and 16
This, in conjunction with axiom PA4, shows 0 is the additive iden-
tity. The multiplicative identity can be proven in a similar way, though it is
necessary prove both x · s(0) = x and s(0) · x = x
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Example 4.34 Prove s(o) is the multiplicative identity of PA, i.e.
∀x(x·s(0) = x)∧∀x(s(0)·x = x). This tableau proof is broken up into parts to
manage its length. Not that α(x) : s(0) · x = x when the Axiom of Induction
is used.
T
1: ¬(∀x(x · s(0) = x) ∧ ∀x(s(0) · x = x)) Negation of wff
2: ∀x∀y∀z(x = y ∧ y = z ⇒ x = z) EA3
3: ∀y1∀y2 · · · ∀yn(α(x//0) ∧ ∀x(α(x)⇒ α(x//s(x)))⇒ ∀xα(x)) PA3
4: ∀x(x+ 0 = x) PA4
5: ∀x∀y(x+ s(y) = s(x+ y)) PA5
6: ∀x(x · 0 = 0) PA6
7: ∀x∀y(x · s(y) = (x · y) + x) PA7
8: ∀x(0 + x = x) by example 4.33
@ 
Γa Γb
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Γb
10: ¬(∀x(s(0) · x = x)) 1
11: s(0) · 0 = 0 ∧ ∀x(s(0) · x = x⇒ s(0) · s(x) = (x))⇒ ∀x(s(0) · x = x) 3
HH
12: ¬(s(0) · 0 = 0 ∧ ∀x(s(0) · x = x⇒ s(0) · s(x) = (x))) 11 13: ∀x(s(0) · x = x) 11
HH
14: ¬(s(0) · 0 = 0) 12 15: ¬∀x(s(0) · x = x⇒ s(0) · s(x) = (x)) 12
16: s(0) · 0 = 0 6 17: ¬(s(0) · b = b⇒ s(0) · s(b) = s(b)) 15
18: s(0) · b = b 12
19: ¬(s(0) · s(b) = s(b)) 12
20: s(0) · s(b) = (s(0) · b) + s(0) 7
21: (s(0) · b) + s(0) = b+ s(0) 18
22: b+ s(0) = s(b+ 0) 5
23: s(b+ 0) = s(b) 4
24: s(0) · s(b) = s(b) 20-24, 2
Γa
9: ¬(∀x(x · s(0) = x)) 1
25: ¬(b · s(0) = b) 1
26: b · s(0) = (b · 0) + b 7
27: (b · 0) + b = 0 + b 6
28: 0 + b = b 8
29: b · s(0) = b 26-28 and 2
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Now a tableau proof of a wff α is a tableau confutation of H ∪ {¬α},
that is, every branch of a finite tableau which contains H ∪ {¬α} as its root
is contradictory. However, it has yet to be shown why a tableau confution of
¬α (where H = ∅) proves the validity of α. It relies on the reasoning that
every branch of a finite tableau which contains ¬α in the root is either finished
or contradictory. If a branch is finished, it (and therefore ¬α) has a model
by the Finished Set Theorem. If every branch is contradictory, there is no
model of ¬α and thus α must be true in every model. In the next chapter,
the Soundness Theorem will be proven which establishes that a tableau proof
of a wff α implies α is valid.
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Chapter 5
Soundness & Completeness
This chapter focuses on the relationship between proofs and validity.
The Soundness Theorem will prove that a wff which has a tableau proof is
valid. This will be accomplished by proving a series of smaller theorems.
First, it will be shown that every finite tableau which has a finite or countable
hypothesis set H that is modeled by M also has a branch which M models.
The second step to prove the soundness theorem is a theorem which proves
that if H has a tableau confutation, then H does not have a model. From this,
the extended soundess theorem can be deduced, which states that if there is a
tableau proof of a wff α from H, then α is a semantic consequence of H. The
soundness theorem is simply the case where H = ∅.
The converse of soundess is completeness which states every valid wff
has a tableau proof. To prove the Completeness Theorem it will be necessary
to first prove every hypothesis set H, whether finite or countably infinite, has
a tableau for which H is the root and whose every branch is either finished
or contradictory and finite. This, along with the Ko¨nig Tree Theorem, will be
used to show H has either a tableau confutation or a model. This will directly
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prove the Extended Completeness Theorem which gives the Completness The-
orem when H = ∅.
5.1 Soundness
Soundness combines validity and semantics to judge the usefullness and
applicability of methods of logical reasoning. Explicitly, soundness is the prop-
erty which says any wff which has a proof of validity is also true. The previous
chapter claimed a tableau proof of a wff α established the validity of α. The
Soundness Theorem proves this claim. Recall that a tableau proof is a tableau
confutation of H ∪ {¬α} where α is the wff under consideration and H is the
hypothesis set. When H = ∅, then a tableau confutation of ∅ ∪ {¬α} = {¬α}
is a proof that α is valid. By definition, a wff is valid only if it is true in
every model, thus the property of soundness can be stated as the following
thoeroem:
Theorem 5.1 The Soundness Theorem: If a wff has a tableau proof, then
it is valid.
The proof for the soundness theorem will be approached using a series
of theorems that can be proven simultaneously for sentential and first order
logic. First, it will be shown that every finite tableau which has a finite or
countable hypothesis set H that is modeled by M also has a branch which M
models. This is expressed by the following theorem:
Theorem 5.2 If T is a tableau with finite or countable hypothesis set H and
M |= H, then there is a branch Γ of T such that M |= Γ.
However, in first order logic, this occurs in a universe U , and the wffs
may have free variables or parameter symbols x1, x2, · · · , xn, that are not in
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U . Thus it is necessary to replace such individuals with suitable elements a1,
a2, · · · , an, from U . Such a replacement in a wff α is called a valuation, and
will either be denoted by α(x1, x2, · · · , xn//a1, a2, · · · , an) or α(v) where v
is the substitution (x1, x2, · · · , xn//a1, a2, · · · , an). Similarly, the notation
Γ(v), where Γ is a set, indicates every wff α in Γ is of the form α(v). Thus in
first order logic, theorem 5.2 actually says M |= Γ(v) for some v. Hypothesis
sets H from first order logic will also be considered to only contain wffs with
no free variables or parameters.
The proof for theroem 5.2 is the longest and most complicated in this
section. It uses induction and case analysis on the formation of the tableau T,
the branch Γ or, in first order logic, Γ(v), and the valuation v. The theorem
is even broken into two parts, a and b, the first of which proves the theorem
in sentential logic and the second in first order. Thus, before even attempting
the proof, it is helpful to first consider a small example tableau.
Example 5.3 Let T be a first order logic tableau in a universe U with the
finite hypothesis set {∃x(α(x) ⇒ β(x))}, modeled by M . Prove there is a
branch Γ in T which M also models, i.e. M |= Γ(v) for some valuation v. Now
T is Tn for some finite tableau chain T0, T1, · · · , Tn. Thus the branch which
M models can be found by examining the formation of the various branches
in the tableau chain as well as any valuations (x//y) which occur. Now T0 is
the hypothesis set, so there is only one possible branch Γ0 which also contains
the hypothesis set.
116
T0 = Γ0
1: ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) Hypothesis
There are no free variables or parameters to consider, so the valuation
corresponding to Γ0 is the empty set, that is, v0 = ∅. Obviously M |= Γ0 as M
models the hypthesis set. By proposition 3.44, M |= ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) implies
M |= (α(x//b)⇒ β(x//b)) for some b ∈ U . This means when T1 is obtained
from T0 by extending at 1, T1 and Γ1 are both formed by adding the child
α(x//y)⇒ β(x//y) and creating the valuation v1 = (y//b).
T1 = Γ1
1: ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) Hypothesis
2: α(x//y)⇒ β(x//y) 1
Because M |= (α(x//b) ⇒ β(x//b)), M |= Γ1(v1). Now there are two
ways to extend T1 using 2, so Γ2 could be formed by either the addition of
the node corresponding to the wff ¬α(x//b) or β(x//b), exclusively. As there
are no new free variables or parameters to consider, v2 = v1.
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Γ2 : M |= ¬α
1: ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) Hypothesis
2: α(x//y)⇒ β(x//y) 1
 
3: ¬α(x//y) 2
Γ2 : M |= β
1: ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) Hypothesis
2: α(x//y)⇒ β(x//y) 1
@
4: β(x//y) 2
T2 = T
1: ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x)) Hypothesis
2: α(x//y)⇒ β(x//y) 1
  @
3: ¬α(x//y) 2 4: β(x//y) 2
Now T2 is finished, so T2=T. By proposition 2.48, eitherM |= ¬α(x//b)
or M |= ¬β(x//b), or both. Γ2 is chosen based on which wff is modeled by
M . Thus M models every wff in the branch Γ2(v2) = Γ2(y//b) of T, so
M |= Γ2(y//b).
The proof for the theorem will proceed in much the same way as this
example. A chain of branches corresponding to the tableau chain will be
constructed. Induction will prove each one is modeled by M . In the proof for
first order logic, the valuations will be constructed as well.
Theorem 5.2a If T is a finite sentential tableau with finite or countable
hypothesis set H which is modeled by M , then there is a branch Γ of T such
that M |= Γ.
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Proof: To prove this theorem, it is necessary to find at least one branch
Γ of T where every wff which occurs on Γ is true in M . From definition 4.22
it is known T is Tn for some finite tableau chain T0, T1, · · · , Tn. Thus it is
possible to construct a chain of branches Γ0 , Γ1, · · · , Γn where each branch
is formed from the one before it and each Γk is a branch of Tk. Through
induction, every wff on those branches are proven to be modeled by M . The
last branch, Γn, will satisfy the theorem.
Consider the base case Γ0. Now T0 is the root node and contains only
those wffs from H, so a branch Γ0 of T0, can be defined as the set containing
the root node. As M models every wff in T0, it models every wff on the root
node and thus every wff in Γ0.
Assume M models the branch Γk of Tk, for some k < n. Now Tk+1 is
obtained from Tk by extending at some bachelor node. If this is done other
than at the bachelor node of Γk, Γk+1 is defined to be Γk. As M models Γk, M
models Γk+1. If Tk+1 is found by extending at the bachelor node of Γk, this is
done by applying a tableau extension rule to a wff of Tk There are nine ways
in which this can happen, one for each of the tableau extension rules. Thus
if γ is the ancestor wff used, Γk+1 is defined to be obtained from Γk in the
following ways:
• Case 1: γ = ¬¬α. Form Γk+1 by adding a child β to Γk.
• Case 2: γ = α ∧ β. Form Γk+1 by adding a child α and grandchild β to
Γk.
• Case 3: : γ = ¬(α ∧ β). Form Γk+1 by adding a child ¬α or a child ¬β
to Γk, whichever M models.
• Case 4 : γ = α ∨ β. Form Γk+1 by adding a child α or a child β to Γk,
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whichever M models.
• Case 5: γ = ¬(α ∨ β). Form Γk+1 by adding a child ¬α and grandchild
¬β to Γk.
• Case 6 : γ = α ⇒ β. Form Γk+1 by adding a child ¬α or a child β to
Γk, whichever M models.
• Case 7 : γ = ¬(α⇒ β). Form Γk+1 is formed by adding a child α and a
grandchild ¬β to Γk.
• Case 8 : γ = α ⇔ β. Form Γk+1 by adding a child α and grandchild β
or by adding a child ¬α and grandchild ¬β, whichever two M models.
• Case 9: γ = ¬(α ⇔ β). Form Γk+1 by adding a child α and grandchild
¬β or by adding a child ¬α and grandchild β, whichever two M models.
In these cases, “or” is exclusive (if it was inclusive, Γk+1 would become
two branches). By proposition 2.48, in every case of above, as M models the
ancestor γ, M models every wff added. Thus, as M is assumed to model Γk,
M models Γk+1. By construction, Γk+1 is a branch of Tk+1. Therefore, by
induction, M models a branch Γn of Tn = T and the threorem is proven.
Theorem 5.2b If T is a finite first order logic tableau with a finite or countable
hypothesis set H which is modeled by M , then there is a branch Γ of T such
than M |= Γ(v) for some valuation v.
Proof: This theorem is very similar to that of 5.2a except the wffs γ
which occur along every branch Γk must be modeled by M as γ(vk) for some
valuation vk = (x1, x2, · · · , xl // a1, a2, · · · , al) whose substituted variables
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and parameters are free in Γk. Both the branches Γk and the valuations vk
must be inductively defined.
When k = 0, Γ0 is the root node containing only those wffs from H.
As wffs from H in first order logic are considered to have no free variables or
parameters, v0 is considered to be the empty set.
Assume M models Γk(vk) for some k < n. If Tk+1 is obtained from
Tk by extending at some node other than the bachelor node of Γk, Γk+1 = Γk
and vk+1 = vk. Then M models Γk+1(vk+1) as M models Γk(vk). If Tk+1 is
obtained from Tk by extending at the bachelor node of Γk, this is done by
applying a tableau extension rule to an ancestor γ of Γk. If it is done in one of
the nine ways given by the proof for 5.2a then vk = vk+1 as there are no new
free variables or parameters to consider for the valuation. In the remaining
four scenarios, Γk+1 and vk+1 can be obtained in the following way:
• Case 1: γ = ∀xα. Form Γk+1 by adding the child α(x//y) where y is
a free variable or parameter. If y has already been substituted in vk,
define vk+1 = vk. If not, define
vk+1 = (x1, x2, · · · , xl, y//a1, a2, · · · , al, b)
where b is in U . By proposition 3.44, as M models the ancestor γ(vk),
M models α(vk+1).
• Case 2: γ = ¬∀xα. Form Γk+1 by adding the child ¬α(x//y) where y
is a free variable or parameter that does not occur in any ancestor of γ.
Then y is not substituted in the valuation so define
vk+1 = (x1, x2, · · · , xl, y//a1, a2, · · · , al, b)
where b is in U and chosen such that M models ¬α(vk+1). Such a b is
gauranteed by proposition 3.44.
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• Case 3: γ = ∃xα .Form Γk+1 by adding the child α(x//y) where y is
a free variable or parameter that does not occur in any ancestor of γ.
Then y is not substituted in the valuation so define
vk+1 = (x1, x2, · · · , xl, y//a1, a2, · · · , al, b)
where b is in U and chosen such that M models α(vk+1). Such a b is
gauranteed by proposition 3.44.
• Case 4: γ = ¬∃xα. Form Γk+1 by adding the child ¬α(x//y) where y
is a free variable or parameter. If y has already been substituted in vk,
define vk+1 = vk. If not, define
vk+1 = (x1, x2, · · · , xl, y//a1, a2, · · · , al, b)
where b is in U . By proposition 3.44, as M models the ancestor γ(vk),
M models ¬α(vk+1).
Hence M models Γk+1(vk+1) for every k < n and thus models a branch
Γn(vn) of Tn =T and the theorem is proven.
The second step to prove the soundness theorem is a proof that if
H has a tableau confutation, then H does not have a model (recall that a
tableau confutation of H is a finite tableau with root H where every branch is
contradictory). This is a reversal from the previous theorem which proved a
that a model of the hypothesis set also modeled a branch of its corresponding
tableau. This lack of a model is easy to see in a small example of sentential
logic where every model can be considered.
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Example 5.4 Consider the wff ¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬α∨β)). This has the follow-
ing tableau confutation.
T
1: ¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ β)) Hypothesis
HH
2: (α⇒ β) 1 3: ¬(α⇒ β) 1
4: ¬(¬α ∨ β) 1 5: (¬α ∨ β) 1
6: ¬(¬α) 4
7: ¬β 4
8: α 6
 @
9: ¬α 2 10: β 2
11: α 3
12: ¬β 3
 @
13: ¬α 5 14: β 5
However, as this wff is of sentential logic, it can also be viewed in truth
table form.
α β ¬α α⇒ β ¬α ∨ β ((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ β)) ¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ β))
T T F T T T F
T F F F F T F
F T T T T T F
F F T T T T F
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In this form, it is easy to see that in every possible model, the wff will
be false. This is reasonable, as by the previous theorem, if the wff did have
a model M it would be a model for some branch of the tableau confutation.
But every branch is contradictory, including a wff and its negation, so cannot
be modeled.
The proof for this theorem (explicitly given below) uses the same rea-
soning, showing by contradiction and theorem 5.2 that no model can exist for
a hypothesis set with a tableau confutation.
Theorem 5.5 If H is a finite or countable set of wffs with a tableau confuta-
tion, then H has no model.
Proof: Let H be a finite or countable set of wffs and T a tableau
confutation of H. Assume M models H. Then by theorem 5.2 (a and b), M
models some branch Γ of T (Γ(v) for some valuation v in first order logic).
But T has a tableau confutation so every branch, including Γ (Γ(v)), contains
a wff and its negation. But M cannot model both a wff and its negation, thus
there can be no model of H.
Note that M cannot model both a wff α and its negation because it
would require two different n-ary relations be assigned to the same wff, an
impossibility in a model. Recall that a wff α is a semantic consequence of a
set of wffs H if every model of H is a model of α. The extended soundness
theorem integrates the tableau with semantic consequence and shows that a
tableau proof of α from H proves α is a semantic consequence of H.
Theorem 5.6 The Extended Soundness Theorem: If H is a finite or
countable set of wffs which give a tableau proof of a wff α, then α is a semantic
conseqence of H. That is, if H ` α then H |= α.
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Proof: Let H be a finite or countable set of wffs which give a tableau
proof of a wff α. Then there is a tableau confutation of H∪{¬α}. By theroem
5.5, there is no model M of H ∪ {¬α}, so no model M of H is a model of ¬α.
Thus, if M does model H, it must model α (rather than ¬α). Therefore, by
definition 4.1, H |= α.
When H is the empty set, then a tableau proof shows α is valid. Then
we have theorem 5.1, where ` α implies ∅ |= α. There have been many
examples of tableau proofs showing validity in this thesis, including
• The tree diagram at the beginning of section 4.4 which proved the validity
of modus ponens.
• T8 of the finite tableau chain of example 4.21 which proved the validity
of a DeMorgan’s law.
• The second tableau proof of example 4.26 which proved the law of syl-
logism.
• T2 of example 5.3 which proved the validity of ∃x(α(x)⇒ β(x))
• The tableau proof of example 5.4 which proved the validity of
(α⇒ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ β).
• Examples of section 4.5.
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5.2 Completeness
Completeness is simply the converse of soundness. While soundness
claims every wff with a tableau proof is valid, completeness states every valid
wff has a tableau proof.
Theorem 5.7 The Completeness Theorem: If a wff is valid, then it has
a tableau proof.
The Completeness Theorem will be proven for both sentential and first
order logic in a series of steps and theorems. Theorems 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 will
prove the first step towards the completeness theorem: proving every finite
and countably infinite hypothesis set of both sentential and first order logic
has a tableau for whigh H is the root.
Theorem 5.8 Every finite hypothesis set H of sentential logic has a finite
sentential logic tableau T.
Proof: Let H be a finite hypothesis set of sentential logic. Through
induction, it is possible to construct a finite sentential logic tableau chain T0,
T1, · · · , Tk, · · · , Tn whose last labeled tree Tn is a finite tableau for H. Let
u(Tk) be the length of the longest unused wff in a labelled tree Tk where
u(Tk)=0 only if there are no unused wffs in Tk.
Now T0 is the labelled tree containing the hypothesis set. If u(T0)=0,
then there are no unused wffs and T0=Tn is a finite tableau. If u(T0)6=0, then
form T1 by extending at the bachelor node of T0 using a tableau extension
rule with the longest unused wff of T0 (if several have the same longest length,
simply pick one). Then T1 is formed according to definition 4.18.
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Assume T0, T1, · · · , Tk is the first part of a tableau chain satisfying
definition 4.18. If u(Tk)=0, then there are no unused wffs and Tk=Tn is a
finite tableau. If u(Tk)6=0, then extend to Tk+1 by using the longest unused
wff α of Tk on a noncontradictory branch that includes α. Then Tk+1 is formed
according to definition 4.18.
As the hypothesis set is finite, eventually u(Tn)=0 for some n. Thus,
by induction, T0, T1, · · · , Tk, · · · , Tn is a tableau chain and thus Tn is a finite
tableau with root H.
It is important to note that, as T is a finite tableau, it follows from
definitions 4.18 and 4.22 that each of its branches are either finished or con-
tradictory (and finite). Essentially, the previous proof explicitly outlines an
empirical way to create a tableau chain from a finite hypothesis set using the
tableau extension rules. However, it does not necessarily give the quickest way.
For instance, consider the tableau chain given in example 4.21. The
hypothesis set was simply the wff ¬(¬(α ∧ β) ⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β)). Following the
outline of the proof, the tableau chain goes as follows:
T0
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
T1
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
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At this point, T1 has unused wffs of length (in order of node numbering)
6, 8, 7, and 5. Thus T2 will be formed by using the node 3 (as was done in
example 4.21).
T2
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
However, now node 2 rather than 4 will used to form T3.
T3
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
  @
8: ¬α 2 9: ¬β 2
As this creates a branch, the remaining ancestor nodes 4 and 5 will
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have to be used twice on each new branch, rather than once as in the previous
example. The nodes 4 and 5 are each extended from once to form T4 and then
T5 T5
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
  @
8: ¬α 2 9: ¬β 2
10: α ∧ β 4
  @
11: ¬α 5 12: ¬β 5
At this point, there are three remaining nodes which are unused and
all have the same length. Thus they can be chosen arbitrarily, in this case by
node numbering (6 then 7 then 10). Two extensions using 6 in each of its
branches yields two more trees, T6 and T7.
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T7
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
  @
8: ¬α 2 9: ¬β 2
10: α ∧ β 4
  @
11: ¬α 5 12: ¬β 5
13: α 6 14: α 6
Now node 7 is used to form T8. As the far left branch is contradictory,
it is not necessary to extend through the bachelor node 13, so the extension
only occurs through 14. An additional extension using node 10 can occur
twice through each branch it is an ancestor of, giving T10
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T10
1: ¬(¬(α ∧ β)⇔ (¬α ∨ ¬β))
   
  `````
2: ¬(α ∧ β) 1 4: ¬¬(α ∧ β) 1
3: ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) 1 5: ¬α ∨ ¬β 1
6: ¬¬α 3
7: ¬¬β 3
  @
8: ¬α 2 9: ¬β 2
10: α ∧ β 4
  @
11: ¬α 5 12: ¬β 5
13: α 6 14: α 6
15: β 7
16: α 10 17: α 10
18: β 10 19: β 10
Note that not only are there three more nodes, it took two more labeled
trees to complete the tableau chain. The next theorem is very similar to
the previous one, proving a countably infinite hypothesis set can also have a
tableau which has many of the properties of a finite tableau.
Theorem 5.9 Every countably infinite hypothesis set H of sentential logic
has a tableau T such that every branch is either finished or contradictory and
finite.
Proof: LetH be a countably infinite set of hypothesisH = {α1, α2, · · · , αk, · · · }
and Hk be a finite subset of the first k hypothesis of H, Hk = {α1, α2, · · · , αk}.
By theorem 5.8, every Hk has a corresponding finite tableau Tk. Thus it is
possible to use the theorem countably many times and get a sequence of finite
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tableaus T0, T1, · · · , Tk, · · · , such that:
• T0 contains only a root node,
• For each k > 0, Tk is a finite tableau for Hk, and
• For each k > 0, Tk+1 is obtained from Tk in acccordance with definition
4.18.
Let T be the union T= ∪∞k=0Tk and Γ a branch of T. If Γ is contradic-
tory, then it contains both a wff α and its negation ¬α. Then there exists some
k such that both α and ¬α are in TK . Then Γ∩Tk is already a contradictory
branch of Tk. But by definition 4.18, the contradictory branch Γ∩Tk is never
extended after Tk is obtained, so Γ = Γ∩Tk and thus is finite. If Γ is not
contradictory, then, as it was constructed in accordance with definition 4.18,
it must be finished (recall the definition of a finished set, 4.8).
Hence T is a tableau such that every branch is either finished or con-
tradictory.
Both of these last two theorems were applicable only in sentential logic,
but they can also be proven for first order logic in the form of the next theorem.
Note that, as in the previous chapter, any hypothesis set H of first order logic
will be assumed to have no free variables or parameters.
Theorem 5.10 Let U be a finite or countably infinite set of parameter symbols
and H be a finite or countably infinite set of first order logic wffs. Then there
is a tableau T on U with root H such that no free variables occur on T and
every branch of T is either finished or contradictory and finite.
Proof: Let U be a countably infinite set of parameter symbols
U = {u1, u2, · · · , uk, · · · }, H a finite or countably infinite set of first order logic
wffs, H = {α1, α2, · · · , αk, · · · }, and Hk be the set of the first k elements of
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H, Hk = {α1, α2, · · · , αk}, where, if H is finite, Hn = H for n ≥ k. Then it is
possible to define a sequence of finite tableaus T0, T1, · · · , Tk, · · · such that:
• T0 contains only a root node,
• For each k > 0, Tk is a finite tableau with root Hk,
• For each wff α on a non-contradictory branch Γ of Tk+1 such that α ∈Tk
the following hold:
– If α = ∀xβ then β(x//ui) is also on Γ for every
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k + 1}.
– If α = ¬∃xβ then ¬β(x//ui) is also on Γ for every
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k + 1}.
– If α is of any other form, α is used at least once along Γ according
to the tableau extension rules of definition 4.19.
This means if α is of the form ¬∀xβ or ∃xβ, then ¬β(x//ui) or β(x//ui),respectively,
is on Γ for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k, · · · }. Similarly, if α has the form β1∨β2,
¬(β1 ∧ β2), or β1 ⇒ β2, exactly one child is on Γ.
Thus Tk+1 is constructed from Tk in finitely many stages (note that if
the wffs of form ∀ and ¬∃ had not been restricted to i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k+ 1} this
would not be true). Consider the tableau T=∪∞k=0Tk. It is necessary to prove
that every branch of T is either finished or contradictory.
If Γ is contradictory, then it contains both a wff α and its negation ¬α.
Then there exists some k such that both α and ¬α are in TK . Then Γ∩Tk is
already a contradictory branch of Tk. But by definition 4.19, the contradictory
branch Γ∩Tk is never extended after Tk is obtained, so Γ = Γ∩Tk and thus is
finite.
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If Γ is not contradictory then it is necessary to show its wffs are a
finished set. Let α be a wff on Γ. Then for some k, α is in Tk. Now Γ∩Tk+1
is a branch of Tk+1, so by construction α has been used in Γ∩Tk+1 and thus
Γ. Thus, the following is true:
• If α is of the form ∀xβ or ¬∃xβ then for every n > k and i ≤ n, β(x//ui)
or ¬β(x//ui), respectively, is on Γ∩Tn.
• If α is of the form ¬∀xβ or ∃xβ, then β(x//ui) is in Γ for every
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k, · · · }.
• If α has the form β1 ∨ β2, ¬(β1 ∧ β2), or β1 ⇒ β2, then exactly one child
is in Γ.
• If α is of the form ¬¬β, then β is in Γ.
• If α is of the form β1 ∧ β2, ¬(β1 ∨ β2), or ¬(β1 ⇒ β2 then both the child
and grandchild are in Γ.
• If α is of the form β1 ⇔ β2 or ¬(β1 ⇔ β2) then one child and the
associated grandchild are in Γ.
Thus, by definition 4.8, Γ is a finished branch. Thus T is a tableau
with hypothesis set H whose branches are either finished or contradictory and
finite.
Thus it is now known every finite or countably infinite hypothesis set
H of sentential logic or first order logic has a tableau whose every branch is
either finished or contradictory and finite.
Recall that it has been proven that an implication α ⇒ β and its
contrapositive ¬β ⇒ ¬α are equivalent (see example 4.24). The Ko¨nig Tree
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Theorem proves a result of the form α⇒ β, but only its contrapositive is used
in later theorems.
Theorem 5.11 The Ko¨nig Tree Theorem: If a tree T has infinitely many
nodes and each node has a finite number of children, then there is a branch Γ
of T such that Γ is infinite.
Proof: This proof will construct by induction an infinite branch of T
consisiting of an infinite sequence of nodes t0, t1, t2, · · · such that t0 is the root
node, tn+1 is a child of tn, and each tn has an infinite number of descendents
(children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc).
Let T be a tree with infinitely many nodes, each with a finite number
of children. Now t0 is the root node and by hypothesis has an infinite number
of descendents but only a finite number of children. If every one of these
children had a finite number of descendents, t0 would have a finite number of
descendents as well. Thus, at least one of its children must have an infinite
number of descendents. Choose t1 to be any one of those children.
Consider any node tn with an infinite number of descendents. By sim-
ilar reasoning, at least one of its finitely many children must have an infinite
number of descendents. Choose any one of these children to be tn+1. Thus, by
induction, there is an infinite set of nodes {t0, t1, t2, · · · } such that t0 is the root
node, tn+1 is a child of tn, and each tn has an infinite number of descendents.
This set forms an infinite branch Γ of T.
Hence the contrapositive of the Ko¨nig Tree Theorem states that if there
is no infinite branch of a tableau T, then either T has a finite number of
nodes or a node has an infinite number of children. If every branch of T is
contradictory (and thus finite) the contrapositive says that if every branch is
finite then T has a finite number of nodes.
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Theorem 5.12 If T is a tableau whose every branch is either finished or con-
tradictory, then either T has at least one finished branch or T is a tableau
confutation.
Proof: Suppose T has no finished branches. Then every branch must
be contradictory and finite. By the contrapositive of the Ko¨nig Tree Theorem,
as there are no infinite branches and every branch is contradictory and finite,
there must be a finite number of nodes and thus T must be a finite tableau.
Thus, as every branch is contraditory and T is finite, by definition 4.23, T is
a tableau confutation.
If T has a least one finished branch then it cannot be contradictory and
by definition 4.23, T is a not a tableau confutation.
Theorem 5.13 Let H be a finite or countably infinite set of sentential logic
or first order logic wffs. Then either H has a tableau confutation (in which no
free variables occur in first order logic) or H has a model.
Proof: LetH be a finite or countably infinite set of wffs and suppose
H does not have a tableau confutation. By theorems 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10, H
does have a tableau T (in which no free variables occur in first order logic)
whose every branch is either finished or contradictory and finite. Since, by
assumption, T is not a confutation, theorem 5.12 tells us T must have at least
one finished branch. Thus by theorem 4.12, the finished branch, and thus the
hypothesis set H, must have a model.
If H does not have a model, then T cannot have a finished branch and
thus by theorems 5.8, 4.12, and 5.10, every branch must instead be contradic-
tory and finite.
The Extended Completeness Theorem is a direct result.
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Theorem 5.14 The Extended Completeness Theorem: If a wff α is a
semantic consequence of a finite or countably infinite set of wffs H, then there
is a tableau proof of α from H, i.e. H |= α⇒ H ` α.
Proof: Let α be a semantic consequence of the finite or countably
infinite set of wffs H. Then H ∪ {¬α} has no models. Then by theorem 5.13,
H ∪ {¬α} must have a tableau confutation, that is, a tableau proof of α from
H.
When H = ∅, then ∅ |= α implies α is valid and the theorem becomes
the Completeness Theorem given at the beginning of this section.
5.3 Examples
Consider soundness and completeness in the axiomatic systems of Zermelo-
Fraenkel set thoery, group theory, and Peano Arithmetic. Recall that a the-
orem in an axiomatic system is a true wff whose validity has been shown
through a tableau proof whose hypothesis set H is the axioms of the system.
In other words, if H gives a tableau proof of α (H ` α), then α is a semantic
consequence, that is, true in the same models, of H (H |= α). Thus axiomatic
systems are sound by the Extended Soundness Thoerems. Note this is also a
matter of semantics; the axioms of each system are assumed to be true and
the thoerems are provably true by that assumption.
Is it possible an axiomatic system may prove both a wff α and its
negation ¬α? Such an occurence would be disastrous, as a system which can
prove a wff and its negation can prove anything at all. Thus it is desirable to
prove (from within) that a given axiomatic system is consistent.
Definition 5.15 A axiomatic system is consistent if there is no wff α such
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that α and ¬α are provable from its axioms. A axiomatic system is
ω-consistent if there is no wff α(x), where x is a free variable, such that α(x)
is true for each x and ∃x(¬α(x)) is true.
An axiomatic system T which is ω-consistent is also consistent. An ω-
consistent system not only avoids proving a contradiction but also avoids prov-
ing both an infinite sequence of wffs (by induction, usually) and the existence
of a contradiction of one of those wffs. Kurt Go¨del introduced ω-consistency
in his proof of the Incompleteness Theorems, the subject of the next chapter.
His proof also showed Peano Arithmetic, indeed any axiomatic systems suf-
ficiently powerful enough to be expressed by natural numbers (that is, by a
Go¨del numbering as explained in the next section), cannot be sound, consis-
tent, and complete. Thus the task of proving consistency and completeness of
such systems will not be attempted here, but rather addressed at the end of
the following chapter.
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Chapter 6
Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorems
This chapter is concerned with axiomatic systems which are sound,
ω-consistent, complex enough to perform arithmetic, and whose axioms can
be listed using an algorithm (such as a computer program). Go¨del’s First
Incompleteness Theorem establishes the existence of a wff G in such a system
T which is true but not provable in the system, implying T cannot be complete.
This is done in three steps: expressing every wff of T as a natural number,
creating a wff which asserts its own unprovability, and proving such a wff is true
metamathematically. Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem is a corallory
of the first and establishes that if T asserts its own consistency then T must
be inconsistent.
For the remainder of this paper, let T denote a sound, ω-consistent ax-
iomatic system able to express elementary arithmetic (“sufficiently complex”)
and whose axioms can be listed using an algorithm (“effectively generated”).
139
6.1 Go¨del Numbering
Go¨del numbering is a method of describing wffs (and strings) of T as
natural numbers. Each individual symbol of T is assigned a natural number.
For example, various symbols of Peano Arithmetic can be labelled as follows:
0 x + = ( ) s · ¬ ∨ ∀
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Thus every string of length n can be expressed as a sequence of natural
numbers q1, q2, · · · , qn. The Go¨del number of such a wff is given by the product
pq11 ·pq22 · · · pqnn where pi is the ith prime number (p1 = 2, p2 = 3, p3 = 5, etc). For
example, the wff 0 +x = x corresponds to the Go¨del number 21 ·33 ·52 ·74 ·112
= 392203350. Note that this method gives every wff a unique Go¨del number.
By the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, also known as the Unique-Prime-
Factorization Thoerem, every natural number can be factored into the form
pq11 ·pq22 · · · pqnn . Thus every Go¨del number can be deconstructed back into a wff
of T. For instance, the number 1732825710 can be factored to 21 ·38 ·51 ·74 ·111,
which can be deconstructed to 0 · 0 = 0 by the given symbol assignments in
PA.
Although every Go¨del number is unique, the Go¨del numbering is not
as there are infinitely many possible assignments. Go¨del had a different num-
bering system where he associated each “variable of type n” (n-ary predicate)
with a number of the form pn where p is a prime strictly greater than 13. This
type of system is based on prime factorization, but there are other methods
as well, as illustrated by examples 6.1 and 6.2.
Example 6.1 H. Jerome Keisler in Mathematical Logic and Computablity also
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assigned natural numbers to each symbol, but the natural number which rep-
resented each string was deconstructed in an entirely different way. Rather
than prime factorization, each decimal place gave an indication of which sym-
bols the string contained (where the places are counted 4321, and 4 is in the
fourth decimal place). The even decimal positions marked the beginning and
endings of various symbols, where the number 1 indicated a continuation of a
symbol and a 2 indicated the beginning of a new symbol. The odd positions
contained the numbers corresponding to the various symbols. For example,
with the symbol labelling given previously, in Keisler’s notation, ∀x(x = x)
becomes
1 1 1 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 6
(the actual numbers corresponding to the symbols are enlarged). To
ensure every natural number is a Go¨del number, the single digits 0-9 are con-
sidered to be the empty sequence, any number greater than 2 in an even
decimal place is treated as 2, and the number 0 in an even decimal place acts
as as 1. [12, pp. 208-210]
Example 6.2 Douglas Hofstadter in his novel Go¨del, Escher, Bach, assigned
each symbol a three digit natural number justified by his own, rather inter-
esting, reasoning. For example, he gave 0 the natural number 666 as it is
the number of the beast and = and ∃ the numbers 111 and 333, respectively,
because they ‘looked’ like the symbols. [10, pg.68]
Finite sequences of strings or wffs, such as those which comprise a
tableau proof, can also be represented by a (exremely large) Go¨del number as
well. For instance, consider the tableau proof of the equivalence between an
implication and its contrapositive, given in example 4.24 and listed again here
for convenience.
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1: ¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α))
 HH
2: α⇒ β 1
3: ¬(¬β ⇒ ¬α) 1
6: ¬β 3
7: ¬(¬α) 3
8: α 7
  @
9: ¬α 2 10: β 2
4: ¬(α⇒ β) 1
5: ¬β ⇒ ¬α 1
11: α 4
12: ¬β 4
  @
13: ¬(¬β) 5 14: ¬α 5
15: β 13
It is possilbe to express this proof as a sequence of Go¨del numbers, each
corresponding to the wff of a numbered node. For example, label the symbols
of the tableau in the following way
α β ¬ ⇒ ⇔ ( ) 1 2 · · · 15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 22
Then (α⇒ β)⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α) has the Go¨del number:
26315472117135172197235296313372414433471537
Let each wff of the tableau proof be preceded by its associated node
number and denoted by the corresponding Go¨del number, for example,
1¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α)) has the Go¨del number:
28335676111134172197235296313372414433471537597
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Each such wff and node of the tableau can be listed as one string:
1¬((α⇒ β)⇔ (¬β ⇒ ¬α))2α⇒ β3 · · · 15β
This string can be expressed by the following Go¨del number:
283356761111341721972352963133724144334715375976196717147327910 · · · 373223792
As the wffs themselves do not contain natural numbers, the numbers
corresponding to the nodes mark the begining of a new wff from inside the
string. Thus the above Go¨del number corresponds to a proof for the equiva-
lence of an implication and its contrapositive.
Go¨del numbering allows wffs to reference proofs, other wffs, and, indi-
rectly (for now), themselves via their Go¨del numbers. For instance, consider a
wff α(x) of T with one free variable whose Go¨del number is a. Then the sub-
stitution (x//a) produces a wff α(a) which indirectly refers to its (previous)
self. Note that α(a) is a different wff than α(x) and thus has a different Go¨del
number. However, is it possible for a wff to directly reference itself? That is,
does a wff α(a) whose Go¨del number is also a exist? This question arises, and
is answered, in the next section when the Go¨del sentence is constructed.
6.2 The Go¨del Sentence
From the previous section it is known natural numbers can represent
both proofs and wffs. If x is the Go¨del number of a sequence of strings and
y is the Go¨del number of a wff, then a binary predicate PRF (x, y) can be
defined whose associated n-ary relation expresses the statement x proves y (in
T), that is x ` y. Then PRF (x, y) is true when x does prove y and false
when it does not, i.e. when (x, y) ∈ PRF T (x, y). This predicate corresponds
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to a numerical relationship between x and y. In the previous section it was
observed
283356761111341721972352963133724144334715375976196717147327910 · · · 373223792
was the Go¨del number of a tableau proof of a wff with the Go¨del number
26315472117135172197235296313372414433471537
By observing the powers in both numbers, it is evident the wff is embedded in
the beginning of the proof (indeed, it occurs after the symbols for 1, ¬, and (
have occurred). PRF (x, y) corresponds to this numerical relation between x
and y.
Definition 6.3 A proof pair (x, y) is an ordering of any two Go¨del numbers
x and y such that PRF (x, y) is true.
Consider a wff G with a Go¨del number g. Then it is possible to contruct
another wff ¬∃xPRF (x, g) which states there is no sequence of strings that
proves G. Now, suppose G is the wff ¬∃xPRF (x, g), i.e. ¬∃xPRF (x, g) has
the Go¨del number g. Then G is a wff which asserts its own unprovability. Such
as wff is called a Go¨del sentence, which is why it is denoted by G. Of course,
finding this natural number g is difficult as it occurs in the wff and thus will
affect any attempt at calculating it. Thus it is necessary to prove g can be
found, and exists.
Let αi(x) be any wff which includes x as a free variable. Now every
string, wff, and collection of wffs (e.g. proofs) of T can be represented by a
unique Go¨del number. As Go¨del numbers are natural numbers and natural
numbers are countable, the number of wffs from T are also countable. Thus
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every αi(x)’s can be counted and numbered and the αi(x) for every x ∈ N can
be viewed through Cantor’s diagonal argument in the table below.
x = 1 x = 2 x = 3 · · · x = n · · ·
i = 1 α1(1) α1(2) α1(3) · · · α1(n) · · ·
i = 2 α2(1) α2(2) α2(3) · · · α2(n) · · ·
i = 3 α3(1) α3(2) α3(3) · · · α3(n) · · ·
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
i = n αn(1) αn(2) αn(3) · · · αn(n) · · ·
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
Thus this table gives every wff with a single free variable x. Each wff
also has a Go¨del number which can be denoted by ai(x) for αi(x). Consider
the wff ¬∃yPRF (y, ax(x)) which says that αx(x) (the wffs on the diagonal)
cannot be proven. However, this is a wff with a single free variable x and thus
must be αn(x) for some n and listed in the table. Thus it is able to describe
itself as unprovable, as when x = n, αn(n) is the wff ¬∃yPRF (y, an(n)). G is
thus αn(n) and the Go¨del number g is an(n). Hence G exists. However, is G
true or false? This is proven by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
6.3 Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems
Go¨del First Incompleteness Theorem was proposition VI from his On
Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Sys-
tems. Now that G has been constructed and shown to exist, the actual proof
of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorems is fairly short and simple.
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Theorem 6.4 Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem: Every sound and
ω-consistent axiomatic system complex enough to support Go¨del numbering
contains a statement which is true, but not provable in the system.
This theorem simply states that our previously defined axiomatic sys-
tem T is not complete.
Proof: Let T be an axiomatic system and G a wff in T as previously
defined. If G is false, then ¬(¬∃yPRF (y, g)), or ∃yPRF (y, g), is true and G
must be provable. As T is sound, every wff with a proof is true, thus G must
be true and hence unprovable, a contradiction in T as it is consistent. Thus G
cannot be false and therefore must be true, but unprovable. Therefore there
exists a statement G in T which is true but not provable.
Thus Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem is proven. Note that G is
true by metamathematical reasoning; no proof exists within the system T of
¬∃yPRF (y, g).
Theorem 6.5 Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem: Any sound,
sufficiently complex, and effectively generated axiomatic systemt can prove its
own consistency if and only if it is inconsistent.
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem states that our previously de-
fined axiomatic system T (where T does not have an assumption of consis-
tency) can only prove its consistency if it is inconsistent.
Proof: Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem is an easy corollary
of the first. Let G remain as defined and T be as previously defined except
without ω-consistentcy. Let α be the proposition T is consistent. If α is true
then the wff G exists in T. Recall ` α indicates there is a proof for α. Then if
α is true:
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1: α⇒ G is true by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
2: ` α⇒` G by 1 and implication.
3: 0 G ⇒0 α by contrapositive of 2.
4: 0 G is true by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
5: 0 α by modus ponens applied to 3 and 4.
Therefore a proof of the consistency of T does not exist in T. Verbally,
this argument goes as follows where T is assumed to be consistent.
1: By Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem, a consistent system T
contains G.
2: Thus if there is a proof of T’s consistency then there is a proof for G.
This follows from, given two wffs α and β, (α⇒ β)⇒ (` α⇒` β).
3: The contrapositive of this implies if G is unprovable then T’s consis-
tency is unprovable.
4: G is unprovable by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem.
5: Thus, by modus ponens, the consistency of T cannot be proven.
Thus T can only prove its consistency if it is inconsistent.
Note that it is only impossible to prove the consistency of T from within.
The consistency of a system may have a proof in another, separate system. Of
course, then it is necessary to prove that system’s consistency.
Together, Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems state that every sound,
sufficiently complex, and effectively generated axiomatic system is either in-
complete or inconsistent. This means Zermelo-Fraenkel set thoery, group the-
ory, and Peano Arithmetic are either incomplete or inconsistent; either they
contain wffs which are true but unprovable or they can prove both a wff and
its negation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Prove that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent. Go¨del’s Incomplete-
ness Theorems establish that such a sound, sufficiently complex, and effectively
generated system, if it is complete, can not prove its own consistency. How-
ever, there is some debate whether these theorems truly solve Hilbert’s second
question. Although Kurt Go¨del eliminated the possibility of a proof for the
axioms of arithmetic from the axioms themselves, a proof may still exist from
some other method or system. The Go¨del sentence, G, itself is proven in such
a way, using reasoning from outside the system of which it is a sentence. How-
ever, the reasoning was proven to be both sound and complete. Any new proof
for the consistency of arithmetic must meet the same criteria.
Inconsistency or incompleteness; Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems es-
tablish the inherent hindrance of axiomatic systems which use arithmetic,
raising concerns in mathematics, computer science, and even philosophy. If
an axiomatic system is inconsistent, then anything and everything may be
proven. If the system is incomplete, mathematicians must keep in mind there
may exist unsolvable problems. Effectively generated axiomatic system can
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be expressed via an algorithm and thus programmed into a computer or Tur-
ing machine. In computer science, Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems imply
certain internal limitations of computers. Humans, who can work ‘outside’ a
system, will know what the computer doesn’t: that certain unprovable wffs
are theorems. Philosophically, the question becomes which axioms should be
accepted and why? Does the existence of a true yet unprovable sentence jus-
tify the use of intuition in mathematics? Certain axiomatic systems, such as
those proposed by Tarski for elementary Euclidean geometry have been proven
to be complete. Is there any other way to consider arithmetic which avoids
incompleteness?
Despite the uncertainty raised by Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems,
mathematicians are, for the most part, unaffected. Mathematicians work on
in much the same way as before Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems, even know-
ing someone may be laboring to prove the inconsistency of the system in which
they endeavor. Perhaps if the inconsistency of a system was established, math-
ematicians would use it nevertheless.
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